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RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S "ANSWER TO 'STATEMENT OF ISSUES /M
In the Reply (sic) Brief of Appellee Parker M. Nielson
(hereafter "Nielson") purports to redefine the issues on appeal
as being limited to only those issues that he wants to discuss,
i.e. sanctions against Gurley's counsel and alleged untimely
filing of the Notices of Appeal.

The issues are correctly set

forth in the Brief of Appellant.

Argument relative to Nielson's

claim of untimely filing of a Notice of Appeal is addressed
herein and in Appellant's Verified Memorandum in Opposition to
Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, filed in the Utah
Supreme Court and attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
With regard to the personal attack leveled at Gurley's
counsel throughout Nielson's brief, counsel refuses to be baited
into Nielson's game of name-calling.

Contrary to Nielson's

misrepresentation, counsel for Gurley has not been "sanctioned"
by the Utah Supreme Court or by any other court in the State of
Utah.

His attempt to frame the issues in this case as ones of

credibility of counsel is an obvious attempt to avoid discussion
of the legal principles and case law relevant to the
jurisdictional, governmental immunity and summary judgment issues
presented on appeal.
RESPONSE TO NIELSON'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE"
AND "STATEMENT OF FACTS"
Nielson has complained that the Brief of Appellant fails to
cite to the record.

To assist the Court in making reference to

the pivotal pleadings in this case, an Addendum was prepared and
submitted with the Brief of Appellant.
- 1 -

All of the documents in

the Addendum are copies of pleadings filed in this case and
Nielson's opposition brief does not dispute their accuracy or
authenticity.

However, in order to resolve any confusion,

counsel for Gurley has prepared an index to the Addendum which
cross-references the record as Bates stamped by the Third
District Court.

It should be noted, however, that the trial

exhibits which are part of the Addendum do not carry a Bates
stamp from the Clerk and that, as of the filing of this Brief,
many of the pleadings from Nielson's second, identical action,
filed one year after the first action, have not been Bates
stamped by the Third District Court.

These two actions were

subsequently consolidated by the trial court.
In his Statement of the Case, Nielson asserts that "after
Summary Judgment was entered, Gurley asserted that he acted as a
peace officer."

Contrary to this assertion, Gurley asserted in

his Answer and throughout these proceedings that at the time he
seized the trap he did so under color of authority as a peace
officer for the Division of Wildlife Resources. Although Mr.
Gurley's counsel, in answering plaintiff's Complaint, did not
call Mr. Gurley a "peace officer", his affirmative defenses made
clear his allegation that Gurley was acting as a government
employee and was entitled to the defenses afforded him by reason
of his governmental status. See, e.g.. Eighth Defense
(Governmental Immunity), Ninth Defense (failure of plaintiff to
file an undertaking as required by the Governmental Immunity
Act), Tenth Defense (Defendant's acts authorized by law), Twelfth
- 2 -

Defense (limitation of recovery under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act), Thirteenth Defcmse (Defendant acting in the course
of his employment, in good faith, and entitled to immunity
afforded public officials), Fifteenth Defense (absolute and
qualified immunity).

(Answer and Jury Demand, Addendum at 446;

R. at 30-36).
Nielson makes the argument that Gurley cannot discuss
"facts" except as stated by Judge Young in his Summary Judgment
and/or his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered after
trial on the damages issues.
limited.

Appellant clearly is not so

Indeed, appellant asserts that the "facts" determined

by the trial court in granting summary judgment were improper
because there were questions of fact which the court could not
properly resolve on summary judgment.

Thus, it is incumbent upon

appellant to point to the disputed facts in order to make his
argument.
With regard to the jurisdictional issues, the facts
regarding Officer Gurley , s status at the time the trap was seized
are facts from the record, which cannot be disputed.

In addition

to the Affidavit submitted by Officer Gurley, which he claims was
improperly stricken months after the trial court granted
plaintiffs summary judgment on liability, Officer Gurley
testified at the damages trial regarding his status.

At no time

did Nielson submit evidence to contradict Gurley's assertions
that he was in uniform, on duty as a peace officer for the
Division of Wildlife Resources, driving his Division of Wildlife
- 3 -

Resources vehicle and operating under color of authority as a
peace officer of the State of Utah when seizing the trap.

(T.R.

p. 285, Addendum p. 516, Trial Exhibit 14).
As an accommodation to the Court to speed up the trial
process, Officer Gurley submitted his direct testimony at the
damages hearing by affidavit (Id.)

In that Affidavit, the first

ten paragraphs establish that Officer Gurley was a peace officer
employed as a conservation officer for the Division of Wildlife
Resources, that he was so employed on September 8, 1990, and that
he seized the trap in question pursuant to his authority under
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1 as an exercise of his police authority.
At the time the Affidavit was submitted to the Court, Mr. Nielson
advised the Court as follows:
MR. NIELSON:
And I simply advised the Court what
[my objections to the Affidavit] are. I have no
problem with this Affidavit other than with respect to
paragraphs 14, 15, 17, 18 and 19. And my problem with
those is that those are paragraphs in which — of
course, this, as Mr. Ferguson, this is an Affidavit
that was prepared for another purpose, and that
explains why these things are in here, but I don't
think they have any relevance to this case.
(T.R. p. 285)
Dale Gurley's status as a peace officer was also verified by
the testimony of his supervisor Delbert Atkinson (T.R. p. 23 0244) .
Similarly, the "facts" with regard to the procedural history
of this case are taken from the record and the pleadings on file.
Clearly, because the trial court refused to decide on the merits
Gurley's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, there
- 4 -

are no "factual findings" at all regarding the issues of
jurisdiction and governmental immunity•

It is just as clear that

appellant is claiming that the trial court erred in holding that
the defense of subject matter jurisdiction and the defense of
governmental immunity had been waived.

Facts necessary to decide

these legal issues are contained in the pleadings, were raised by
motion below and are properly before this Court.
Moreover, the rulings of the trial court clearly indicate
that Judge Young was treating this case as one against not only
Officer Gurley, but the State of Utah and the Division of
Wildlife Resources and its other employees, as well.

Indeed, the

finding of the trial court of "bad faith" litigation, which is
used by the trial court to justify an award of attorneys' fees
against Gurley, is that "the Division of Wildlife Resources
should have readily offered to remove the defendant from further
enforcement activities on this property knowing full well that
the defendant maintained continuing hostility towards the
plaintiff and his activities."

(Memorandum Decision, f 15,

Addendum p. 047, R. 1912).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because
of plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice provisions of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

As a matter of law,

therefore, the Partial Summary Judgment and Judgment entered
against defendant must be reversed and the case dismissed for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- 5 -

In addition, plaintiff's claims against defendant are barred
by the immunity provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Plaintiff's claims, regardless of how he characterizes them,
arise out of an alleged institution of a judicial proceeding
without probable cause.

Immunity is preserved for such claims

under § 63-30-10(5).
The trial court's award of sanctions in the nature of
attorney's fees against defendant is in error.

Plaintiff, as a

pro se litigant, is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees
in connection with this action.

The order granting sanctions in

favor of plaintiff and against defendant also fails to make
appropriate evidentiary findings justifying said sanction.
ARGUMENT
I.
NIELSON HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS THE CURRENT
STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENT WHICH CLEARLY
APPLIES TO THIS ACTION
Nielson's arguments with regard to compliance with the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 et
contradict each other and are disingenuous.

seq.,

First, he argues

that compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act was not
required because, as a matter of law, Officer Gurley was
overzealous and, therefore, outside of the scope of his
employment.

Of course, in making this argument, Nielson ignores

the "color of authority" language of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

One can only assume that, because he is a licensed

attorney in the State of Utah, Nielson was aware of the Utah
- 6 -

Governmental Immunity Act and its notice provisions and
intentionally ignored them when he filed legal action ten days
after the occurrence and without providing prior notice to the
appropriate governmental entities.
In contradiction of his argument that he need not comply
with the Governmental Immunity Act, Nielson next argues that he
did comply by filing, a year later, another legal action based
upon the identical facts and allegations in the first action.
His argument is that the first legal action sufficed as notice
for the second legal action.

Of course, Nielson ignores the fact

that in filing both legal actions, he did not wait to file them
until after the governmental entities had made a decision with
regard to approval or disapproval of the claims or until after
the ninety-day consideration period had lapsed.

Clearly, Nielson

never intended to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act and
his argument that he accidentally did so is without legal or
factual merit.
A.

Nielson commenced both of his actions without complying with
the statutory notice requirements.
Nielson cannot in good faith dispute that he did not provide

notice of claim before commencing this action against Officer
Gurley on September 17, 1990. Nielson's Complaint was, in fact,
filed only ten days after the incident upon which it is based.
See Complaint (Addendum 2 61, R. 022).
Nielson apparently attempted to correct his failure to
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, circumvent its
notice requirement, and preserve the improper partial summary
- 7 -

judgment by filing a second, identical1 lawsuit (hereafter
"second action") in the same court one year later.
The second action was filed while the first action was still
pending.
notice.

Once more, it was filed without the prerequisite
Although Nielson claims he served notice for this second

action on September 3, 1991 (Resp. Brf., p. 7, n. 1), such notice
is also untimely because it was commenced only six days later
(September 9, 1991), without being denied by the governmental
entities and prior to the running of the statutory ninety-day
period of consideration.
The statutory notice requirement is jurisdictional.
precondition to suit.

Lamarr

v.

Utah Dept.

of

Trans.,

It is a

828 P.2d

535, 540 (Utah App. 1992) . Nowhere in Nielson's opposition brief
does he attempt to distinguish Lamarr,

discredit its holding or

even discuss it. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act notice
requirement clearly precludes any action commenced against a
government employee prior to ninety days following proper notice,
unless the notice of claim is denied earlier by the government.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-15; 63-30-14.
After commencing his second action, Nielson moved for
consolidation of the two identical actions and now argues that
the Complaint in the first action served as statutory notice of
the second, identical action.

(Resp. Brf. p. 19). He also

Prior to filing the second lawsuit, Nielson amended his Complaint in
the first action. (R. 341). The Complaint in the second action contained
identical claims to those in the prior first action's Amended Complaint. (R.
328-341).
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claims that the untimely notice given with respect to the second
action somehow cures the first action and allows preservation of
the partial summary judgment which was entered when the court
lacked jurisdiction.
To sanction such procedural maneuvering would allow
plaintiffs in every instance to circumvent the plain notice
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The Utah

Court of Appeals has explained that neither "effective" notice
nor "actual" notice can cure a failure to comply with the notice
provisions.

Lamarr,

828 P. 2d at 541.

ff

[I]t is quite clear that

the legislature intended to make the filing of a timely notice of
claim prerequisite to maintaining an action."
v.

Sevey,

Id.

(quoting

Varoz

506 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1973).

Nielson has obviously not complied with the statutory notice
requirement.

The District Court never had jurisdiction to hear

the claims asserted against Officer Gurley.

Lamarr,

828 P.2d at

540.
B.

The statutory notice requirement applies to this case.
Nielson does not and cannot dispute Gurley's legal argument

that lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a defense which
cannot be waived.

Rule 12(h)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;

(Resp. Brf. pp. 15-19); Lamarr,

828 P.2d at 540.

Instead,

Nielson argues that the notice requirement does not apply to this
action.2

In doing so, however, he ignores his own express

2
In apparent confusion, Nielson cites Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son,
808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991) as authority for his argument that failure to comply
with the governmental notice requirement is waivable. Watkiss addresses only
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allegations, the trial Court's Memorandum Decision and the
current statutory language and case law.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-11(2) (1991) clearly provides:
Any person having a claim against a governmental
entity, or against an employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of his employment, or under color of
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the
entity before maintaining an action, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
This same language is iterated in § 63-30-12 (1987) :
A claim against the state, or against its employee
for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the attorney general and the agency
concerned within one year after the claim arises, ....,
regardless of whether the function giving rise to the
claim is characterized as governmental.
Nielson argues that the notice requirement does not apply
because the acts or omissions of Officer Gurley did not occur
during the performance of his duties or "under color of
authority.11

Resp. Brf., pp. 15-18.

It is amazing that Nielson

dares to make this argument in light of his prior allegations.
On April 29, 1992, Nielson filed a yet a third action in the
Third District Court against Officer Gurley based on the same
operative facts as this case.

In his Complaint in that action,

Nielson expressly alleged:

a defendant's failure to raise defective service of process as a defense. The
case has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction. 808 P.2d 1066.
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The conduct of . . . Gurley was performed under
color of various statutes, ordinances, regulations,
customs or usages of the State of Utah . . . .
See

Complaint, p. 22, <J[ 60, attached hereto as Exhibit 2.3
Not only is Nielson's argument disingenuous, but, it

improperly equates the distinct legal concepts of "scope of
employment" and "color of authority" and mistakenly confuses the
threshold jurisdictional notice requirement with the ultimate
issue of immunity.

Acceptance of Nielson's interpretation of the

notice requirements would permit circumvention of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act every time a plaintiff alleged that an
employee exceeded his/her authority.
It is obvious from Nielson's own pleadings that his claims
are not of the type thcit could be made against any ordinary
citizen.

This is not ci case in which the defendant just happens

to be a governmental employee.

Nielson is clearly complaining

about the way Officer Ckirley carried out, or failed to carry out
his governmental duties.
In his Complaint, dated September 17, 1990, Nielson bases
his claims on allegations that Gurley failed to comply with
regulations pertaining to "any peace officer or special function
officer."

Verified Complaint, pp. 2-4, 6 and 7 (R. at 019-021,

016-017).

Furthermore, as early as May 1988, Nielson had made

3
This third action was removed to the U.S. District Court, District of
Utah. Recognizing that "It is not disputed that Gurley acted under color of
state law when he seized portions of plaintiff's bird pen," Judge Greene found
and ruled that Officer Gurley had probable cause to believe Nielson's pen was
an illegal trap and dismissed all claims against Gurley on Summary Judgment.
A copy of Judge Greene's Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
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written complaints to the Division of Wildlife Resources
expressly targeting "at least one of your conservation officers
(Mr. Dale Gurley, to be specific). . .".
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 5)

(Addendum, p. 479,

Thus, his statements in his Brief

that "there was no indication, at any time prior to this action"
that Gurley acted in a peace officer capacity" (Resp. Brf., p. 5)
are unbelievable.
Finally, even the trial Court's Summary Judgment decision
was clearly based on defendant's conduct as a peace officer:
Further, the defendant knew or should have been
chargeable with the duty to know that his predetermined
opinions were improper as a wildlife resources
enforcement peace officer and that those individuals
engaged in that aspect of sport training were fully
authorized to engage in such and that defendant's
conduct in complicating their activities was an
inappropriate predilection and bias from which the
defendant should have refrained.
. . .

The court further finds that the defendant went beyond
his appropriate duties as a Wildlife Resources Officer by
contacting the United States Forest Service and the Utah
Division of Lands and Forestry and their officials in
seeking to have those government agencies investigate the
activities of the plaintiff and create problems for the
plaintiff in conducting his appropriate and lawful
activities.
. . .

The court finds that the supervisors of the
defendant in the Division of Wildlife Resources knew or
should have known of the defendant's dislike for the
activities of the plaintiff and others engaged in
similar dog training activities and that they should
have appropriately disciplined the defendant prior to
the destruction by the defendant of the plaintiff's
pen.
. . .

Peace officers, including conservation officers such as
the defendant, are prohibited from breaking into an
enclosure such as that owned by the plaintiff.

- 12 -

[emphasis added] Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-7 (Addendum 43-48, R.
1909-1915).
Clearly the actions of which Nielson complained were acts or
omissions occurring during the performance of Officer Gurley's
duties.

In essence, Nielson claims that Gurley failed to follow

the procedures and rules pertaining to conservation officers.
Gurley's pleadings and testimony clearly established that he was
in uniform and on duty as a peace officer for the Division of
Wildlife Resources when the trap was seized (T. 282, 283,
Addendum 516, Defendant's Trial Exhibit 14). The portions of the
trap that were seized were tagged as evidence and stored in a
Division evidence room.
question.

(Id.)

These facts were never in

It is patently clear that both Nielson and Judge Young

viewed Gurley as a state actor.

Indeed, Gurley's supervisors,

although never made parties, were as much a target of plaintiff's
complaints and the Court's rulings as was Gurley.

Nielson simply

cannot dispute the fact that Gurley was acting under color of
authority.

His sole argument is the legal one that "color of

authority11 and "scope of authority" are synonymous.

As pointed

out above, this is an argument without legal or logical merit and
contradicts Nielson's factual allegations in the third Complaint.
Nielson also confuses the issues of indemnification and
notice requirements.

He argues that if "gross negligence fraud

or malice" are alleged against a government employee, the notice
requirement does not apply.

(Resp. Brf., p. 18).
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While he acuses Gurley's counsel of misciting Madsen
Borthick,

769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) ("Borthick

JJ"), it is Nielson

who actually misrepresents the substance of that opinion.
fails to inform this court that Borthick

v.

He

II was decided on the

old language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11. The Utah Supreme
Court, in fact, noted that the 1987 amendment to the statute had
the effect of expressly requiring service of a notice of claim on
the State in all suits against employees, whether or not any
judgment might be ultimately payable by the State.

769 P.2d at

252 and n. 11.
Borthick

II,

recognized that the determining factors for

notice are not whether malice or fraud are alleged, but rather
whether the underlying actions were "under color of authority" or
"acts or omissions occurring during the performance of [the
employee's] duties.
Borthick

II

See Borthick

II,

769 P.2d at 252, n. 11.

actually is dispositive of this issue in favor of

Officer Gurley.
The Utah Supreme Court's more recent decision in Yearsley
Jensen,

v.

798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990), also disposes of

Nielson7s argument by implicitly recognizing that allegations of
malice are not sufficient to remove claims from the scope of the
governmental notice requirements.

In Yearsley,

the plaintiff

attempted to amend her Complaint against several police officers
to include claims for "malicious assault and battery and
malicious arrest and prosecution."

The trial court refused to

allow plaintiff to add the new claims on the grounds that she had
- 14 -

failed to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's
statutory notice requirements.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed,

recognizing that strict compliance with the notice requirements
is required for these claims. Id.

Nielson's argument that "the

Governmental Immunity Act does not apply if 'the employee acted
or failed to act through fraud or malice'11, (Resp. Brf., p. 17),
is a clear misstatement of Utah law.
II.
NIELSON'S CONVERSION, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
AND DEFAMATION CLAIMS ARE ALL BARRED
BY THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
In addressing the issue of governmental immunity Nielson
avoids discussion of the essence of his claims. As Appellant
Gurley has discussed in his opening Brief, the Utah Supreme Court
has recognized that immunity is to be applied with regard to the
actual essence of the conduct out of which the claim arises,
rather than the spin put on the claim by plaintiff in crafting a
legal theory.

Ledfors

v.

Emery

County

School

Dist.,

849 P.2d

1162, 1166 (Utah 1993).
All of Nielson's claims against Officer Gurley clearly arise
out of Officer Gurley's seizure of Nielson7s bird trap.

(See

Amended Complaint, flf 16-23, Addendum 389, R. 328). Despite
Nielson's attempt to characterize his claims as tort claims, they
are essentially and fundamentally claims arising out of "the
institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause," and are
barred by the immunity provisions of Utah Code Ann.
- 15 -

§ 63-30-10(5).

Fundamental to Nielson's claims, regardless of

their characterization, was the allegation that Officer Gurley
did not have probable cause to seize or interfere with Nielson's
trap and issue a citation.

Contrary to Nielson's argument,

moreover, the statute expressly reserves immunity for such claims
even in the presence of allegations of malice.
It is also vital to remember that the trial court never
considered Gurley's jurisdictional arguments or governmental
immunity argument, which Gurley raised by Motion for Summary
Judgment and by Motion to Dismiss.

Rather, the trial court

improperly ruled that Gurley had waived these defenses.
The district court clearly erred in denying Officer Gurley's
Motion For Summary Judgment.
III.
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED
AND THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR IT
In his opposition brief, Nielson argues that defendant
failed to file timely notice.

Nielson made this same argument by

way of a Motion for Summary Disposition before the Utah Supreme
Court.

The facts relating to the entry of Judgment and an

Amended Judgment and extended argument regarding this issue are
contained in Gurley's Verified Memorandum in Opposition to
Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

For purposes of examining the

timeliness of the Notice of Appeal, the following events are
important and cannot be reasonably disputed:
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1.

On June 24, 1991, the trial court entered Partial

Summary Judgment in favor of plaintiff on issues of liability.
(Addendum 174, R. 322-27).
2.

On October 21 and 22, 1992, trial was held on damage

issues.
3.

On December 18, 1992, the trial court issued a

Memorandum Decision, which purported to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law and awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of
$2,3 00 and attorneys' fees in the amount of $15,000.

(Addendum

p. 42, R. 1908-15) .
4.

On December 21, 1992, defendant filed a Notice of

Appeal, believing that the Memorandum Decision of Judge Young
could be interpreted as a final order. (R. 1933-34) .
5.

On December 30, 1992, Nielson's counsel hand delivered

to Gurley's counsel proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law together with a proposed Judgment.

At the same time, he

delivered these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
to the Court.
6.

(R. 1945-53).

Under Rule 4-504(2), Gurley had until January 7, 1993,

to file objections to the form of the pleadings.

Therefore,

under the Rules of Practice, the Court was precluded from signing
or entering the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
until January 8, 1993.
7.

On January 7, 1993, Gurley's counsel delivered to

Nielson's counsel and the court a letter setting forth certain
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objections to the form of the referenced pleadings.

(R. 1981-

83) .
8.

The trial court signed the proposed Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law and Judgment on January 5, 1993, and these
pleadings were entered by the Clerk on January 7, 1993.
signing and entry of the pleadings were premature.
9.

Both the

(R. 1945-53).

Gurley 7 s counsel was not aware that the Court had

entered Judgment until January 20, 1993.

On January 21, 1993,

Gurley's counsel filed a Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered January 5, 1993.

(R.

1979-80).
10.
Judgment.
11.

On January 27, 1993, Judge Young signed an Amended
(R. 1988-89).
On February 26, 1993, appellant filed a Notice of

Appeal from Amended Judgment.

(R. 2071-72).

Nielson's argument now is that appeal from the Amended
Judgment is untimely because the Amended Judgment only made
"clerical" revisions to the Judgment signed by Judge Young on
January 5, 1993.

Thus, he argues that the Amended Judgment

relates back to the original Judgment and that Gurley had only
until February 8, 1993, to file the Notice of Appeal.
Nielson's argument fails on numerous grounds.

First, he

cites the Court to no Utah case that holds that amending a
judgment to add costs constitutes a "clerical" amendment.
Second, under Utah law, the premature entry of the original
Judgment means that it was never "filed" as that term is used in
- 18 -

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58A(c) (for purposes of
taking a proper appeal).
(Utah 1980); Larsen
Wayne Garff

v.

Larsen,

Construction

(Utah 1985); Calfo
1986); Workman

v.

v.

Bigelow

v. Ingersoll,

674 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1983);

Company,

Inc.

D. C. Stewart

Nagle

n.2 (Utah App. 1990).

618 P.2d 50, 52

v.

Co.,

Construction,

Inc.,

Richards,
Ill

706 P.2d 1065

P.2d 697 (Utah
802 P.2d 749, 750,

Thus, even if Nielson's relation back

theory applied, the Amended Judgment would have nothing to which
to relate back because the January 7, 1993, Order is deemed
legally to have never been "filed".
Finally, Nielson's argument fails to address the Notice of
Appeal filed December 21, 1992.

(R. 1933-34).

While this Notice

of Appeal was entered prior to the actual Judgment, Rule 4(c)
expressly provides that such notice is effective to confer
appellate jurisdiction.

Rule 4(c) provides as follows:

(c) Filing Prior to Entry of Judgment or Order.
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of
the judgment or order of the trial court shall be
deemed treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
Thus, under Rule 58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even if the
January 7, 1993, order had been "filed", the Notice of Appeal
filed on December 21, 1992, is deemed by rule to have been filed
at the same time.
Nielson's jurisdictional argument is clearly without merit.
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IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT
OF DALE GURLEY WITHOUT ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND/OR HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Nielson's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley was
opposed by Gurley and his counsel (Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale
Gurley or Require Compliance with Rule 7 and 11, R. 802).
Clearly, there were factual questions regarding the intent of
Dale Gurley, the truthfulness of the allegations in the
Affidavit, all of which had to be resolved in ruling on the
Motion to Strike.

Rather than hold an evidentiary hearing, Judge

Moffat simply adopted plaintiff's assertions that the "Affidavit
was riddled with untruths".

Moreover, the trial court never made

findings delineating which portions of the Affidavit were true
and which were untrue.
In his opposition brief, Nielson does not dispute that the
trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law with
regard to the Motion to Strike.

Because no findings were

entered, it is impossible for counsel or this Court to divine
what was in the trial court's mind.

Effective review the court's

decision is, therefore, rendered impossible.
Regardless, it is clear that the sanction ordered by Judge
Moffat runs contrary to Utah law.

In his opposing brief, Nielson

does not dispute the legal principle established by Smith
Batchelor,

v.

832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992) that "pro se litigants should

not recover attorneys' fees, regardless of their professional
- 20 -

status."

Rather, Nielson argues that the trial court's award to

him of $3,289 was not an award of attorneys7 fees.
is simply ridiculous.

This argument

Judge Moffat's Order reads in relevant

part:
3.
Sanctions are hereby awarded to Plaintiff and
against Defendant Dale Gurley in the amount of
$3,289.00, representing the fair and reasonable value
of Plaintiff's professional time in searching the
records of the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts, writing
correspondence to counsel requesting voluntary
compliance with Rule 11 and in filing and briefing the
motion granted herein. (emphasis added)
Order Striking Affidavit of Dale Gurley and for Rule 11
Sanctions, 5 3, Addendum at 118, R. 13 67.
What profession other than the practice of law does Nielson
have?

The evidence supporting the award, moreover, was an

Affidavit of Parker M. Nielson in the typical form of an
attorneys' fee affidavit, which itemized the amount of time he
spent and multiplied it by his hourly rate as an attorney of $13 0
per hour (Affidavit of Parker M. Nielson, R. 908, attached hereto
as Exhibit 4 ) . In addition to his own affidavit of attorneys'
fees, Nielson also submitted the Affidavit of Paul Thomas Moxley,
Esq., in Support of Parker M. Nielson's Application for
Reimbursement for Professional Time (R. 910, attached hereto as
Exhibit 5 ) . In this Affidavit, Mr. Moxley reviews his knowledge
of Parker M. Nielson's legal experience and expertise and
confirms that his hourly rate of $13 0 per hour is "a very
reasonable fee given his experience, expertise and standing in
the legal community" (R. 909).
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Nielson's argument that the sanction was an award for
"professional" services that are somehow different from "legal"
services is clearly an empty, semantical one that should be
ignored by this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and for the additional
reasons set forth in the principal brief of appellant, the
Partial Summary Judgment, Judgment, Amended Judgment, and
Judgment Awarding Sanctions should all be dismissed and the
plaintiff's Complaints and causes of action should be dismissed,
Dated this 10th day of February, /9^4.
\lAMS & SUNT

By
DENNIS C. FERGUSON
Attorneys for Appellaht

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of February, 1994, I
caused two true and correct copies of the Reply Brief of
Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Daniel D. Darger
32 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Parker M. Niel^on
655 South 200 /East
Salt Lake City, Utkh \84111

iX/^v

DENNIS C. FERGUSON
Attorneys for Appellant

V
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DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A1061)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,

VERIFIED MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO APPELLEE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

v.
Subject to Assignment to the
Utah Court of Appeals

DALE GURLEY,
Defendant.

Appellate Court No. 920599
900300302

Plaintiff/Appellee has moved the Court for summary dismissal
of defendant's appeal, claiming that the appeal is untimely.
This memorandum is submitted in opposition.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following are the uncontroverted facts relating to the
Motion:
1.

On June 24, 1991, the trial court entered partial

summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on issues of liability.
2.

On October 21 and 22, 1992, trial was held on damage

issues.
3.

On December 18, 1992, the trial court issued a

Memorandum Decision.

The Memorandum Decision purported to make

findings of fact and conclusions of law and awarded plaintiff

property damages in the amount of $2,3 00 and attorneys' fees in
the amount of $15,000.
4.

On December 21, 1992, defendant filed a Notice of

Appeal, believing that the Memorandum Decision of Judge Young
could be interpreted as a final order.

A copy of the trial

court's Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

A

copy of Appellate's Notice of Appeal dated December 21, 1992, is
attached as Exhibit 2.
5.

On December 22, 1992, counsel for plaintiff mailed a

proposed judgment.

A copy of this proposed judgment and the

cover letter of plaintiff's counsel are attached as Exhibit 3.
6.

On December 24, 1992, counsel for defendant mailed a

letter to counsel for plaintiff reflecting objections as to the
form of the proposed judgment.

A copy of this correspondence is

attached as Exhibit 4.
7.

Subsequently, the parties received a Minute Entry from

the trial court indicaiting that "plaintiff is requested to
prepare consistent with the Memorandum Decision and the record,
formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment."
The Minute Entry also indicates that "any hearing requested to
consider the final language will be set in Salt Lake [as opposed
to Tooele County]."

A copy of the Court's Minute Entry is

attached as Exhibit 5.
7.

On December 30, 1992, plaintiff's counsel hand

delivered to counsel for defendant proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law together with a proposed Judgment.
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The

proposed pleadings were delivered with a cover letter which
stated:
I expect that if you have objections, you will
make them within five days as provided by the rule [4504, Code of Judicial Administration]. In the event
that I do not receive your objections within five days,
I will submit this Judgment to the Court for entry. I
believe the clarification set forth in your letter of
the 24th [of December] are taken care of in the
findings. If you have other suggestions, please
contact me.
Copies of the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
Judgment and cover letter of December 30, 1992, are attached as
Exhibit 6.
8.

Also on December 30, counsel for plaintiff delivered a

cover letter to Judge David S. Young stating "enclosed are our
Findings and Conclusions and form of Judgment, pursuant to your
Minute Entry dated December 18, 1992."

This letter to Judge

Young ended "we will appreciate your execution of these Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment after Mr. Ferguson has an opportunity to
present any objections he may have."

The letter to Judge Young,

however, did not indicate the date upon which the proposed
pleadings had been served upon counsel.

A copy of this letter is

attached as Exhibit 7.
9.

Under Rule 4-504(2) copies of proposed findings,

judgments and orders "shall be served upon opposing counsel
before being presented to the Court for signature unless the
Court otherwise orders."

The Rule also provides that "notice of

objection shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five
days after service."

10.

Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that

"when the period of time prescribed or allowed [under these
Rules] is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays
and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation."
11.

January 1, 19 93, was a legal holiday.

January 2 was a

Saturday, January 3 was a Sunday.
12.

Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice of

objections to the form of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment were due on January 7, 1993.

Thus, the first

day that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
could have been presented to the Court for signature and entry in
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was January 8,
1993 .
13.

On January 7, 1993, appellant's counsel delivered to

plaintiff's counsel a letter setting forth certain objections as
to the form of the Judgment and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

A copy of this correspondence is attached as

Exhibit 8.
14.

On January 13, 1993, the Clerk of the Utah Supreme

Court mailed to counsel for appellant a letter indicating that
the transcript had not been ordered and requesting that
compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, be
evidenced within ten days.

A copy of this correspondence is

attached as Exhibit 9.
15.

On January 20, 1993, counsel for appellant hand

delivered a letter to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
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explaining the status of the case and that a final judgment had
not yet been entered and that it was counsel's understanding that
under Rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Notice of
Appeal would be treated as filed after the entry of Judgment "and
on the day thereof."
as Exhibit 10.

A copy of this correspondence is attached

Subsequently, counsel for appellant spoke by

telephone with counsel for plaintiff.

Counsel for plaintiff

indicated that he thought the Judgment may "already have been
entered".

Therefore, counsel for appellant called the Third

District Court Clerk, Tooele County, and learned that the
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment had
been signed by Judge Young on January 5 and entered on January 7,
1993.

Copies of these pleadings are attached hereto as Exhibits

11 and 12, respectively.
16.

On January 21, 1993, counsel for appellant filed a

Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment Entered January 5, 1993, a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit 13.
17.

On January 22, 1993, plaintiff delivered to counsel for

appellant a Notice of Entry of Judgment.

A copy of the Notice of

Entry of Judgment is attached as Exhibit 14.
18.

On January 12, 1993, plaintiff mailed a proposed

Amended Judgment.
19.

On February 2, 1993, plaintiff delivered to counsel for

appellant a Notice of Entry of Amended Judgment, reflecting that
Judge Young signed an Amended Judgment on January 27, 19 93.
- 5 -

A

copy of the Notice of Entry of Amended Judgment is attached as
Exhibit 15.
20.

On February 26, 1993, appellant filed a Notice of

Appeal from the Amended Judgment.

At the same time, appellant

filed pleadings with the district court withdrawing his motion to
set aside the Judgment dated January 5, 1993.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE AMENDED JUDGMENT, ENTERED JANUARY 27, 1993,
IS THE ONLY "FINAL" ORDER.
The Judgment signed by Judge Young on January 5 and entered
by the Third District Clerk on January 7 was done so in
contravention of Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

Because the Judgment was signed and entered

prematurely, it does not qualify as "filed" as required by Rule
58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, it cannot be

treated as an order that was "entered".

Additionally, even if

the January 7, 1993, Judgment is treated as a final order, the
entry of an Amended Judgment on January 27, 1993, became the
final order and commenced a new thirty day appeal period.
It cannot be disputed that the Judgment signed by the Court
on January 5 and entered by the Clerk on January 7, 1993, is one
which has not been properly "filed".

Under the Utah Code of

Judicial Administration, defendant was allowed five days after
service to object to the form of the Judgment.

The form of

Judgment was hand delivered on December 30, 1992.

Excluding

legal holidays and weekends, as required by Rule 6, U.R.C.P., the
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order could not be presented for the Court's signature until
January 8, 1993, assuming notice of objections had not been
delivered.
A judgment entered in contravention of District Court rules
cannot be deemed "filed" under Rule 58A(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 52 (1980).

In

Bigelow, like the present case, two judgments had been entered by
the clerk.

The first judgment failed to comport with Rule 2.9(b)

of the District and Circuit Court Rules of Practice (the
predecessor to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration)
because it had not been presented to opposing counsel for
approval and/or objection.
Subsequently, the trial court signed a second order
identical to the first, except that it carried a later date.
This order, unlike the first, had been presented to opposing
counsel in accordance with Rule 2.9.

The Utah Supreme Court

held, under these circumstances, that only the second judgment
was "filed" within the meaning of Rule 58A:
The notice requirement of Rule 2.9(b) of the
District and Circuit Court Rules is supplemental to and
not inconsistent with Rule 58A U.R.C.P. To harmonize
and give proper effect to these rules, we hold that
compliance with Rule 2.9(b) is necessary in order that
a judgment be properly "filed" as that term is used in
Rule 58A(c), U.R.C.P.
618 P.2d at 52.

The Utah Supreme Court then held that "since the

second judgment was the only one which complied with both state
and local rules and hence was the only one properly 'filed'
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within the meaning of Rule 58A, the notice of appeal was properly
filed based on the judgment filed January 15."

618 P. 2d at 53.

The holding in Bicrelow was reaffirmed in Larsen v. Larsen,
674 P. 2d 116, 117 (Utah 1983).

The Utah Supreme Court once again

held that a judgment which had been prematurely signed by the
Court in contravention of district court rules of practice was
deemed, as a matter of law, to have never been "filed" as that
term is used in Rule 58A(c), U.R.C.P.:
The mailing certificate on both judgments in this
case indicates that the parties mailed their respective
judgments to their opponents on the same day that the
district court signed them. Thus, the record shows
that the parties failed to comply with Rule 2.9(b) by
serving copies of their proposed judgment on their
opponents before presenting them to the Court for
execution. We therefore hold that neither judgment has
been "filed" as that term is used in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 58A(c) for purposes of taking a proper
appeal. . . . Because no judgment has been "filed"
within the meaning of the rule, this appeal is
premature.
Under the rulings in Bicrelow and Larsen, defendant could not have
taken an appeal from the January 7 order because it was signed
before the time for objections had expired under Rule 4-504, Utah
Code of Judicial Administration.

This same result was reached in

Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc., v. Richards, 706 P.2d
1065 (Utah 1985) .
That plaintiff would urge this Court that the January 7
order is the "final" order is particularly curious given the
affirmative representations of plaintiff's counsel that no order
would be presented to the Court for entry until after the five
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day period allowed by Rule 4-504 had expired.

Counsel's letter

of December 30, 1992, states:
Thank you for your clarification set out in your
letter of December 24, 1992. However, since I served
our previous proposed Judgment, Judge Young has ordered
that Findings of Fact be prepared. Therefore, pursuant
to Rule 4-504, C.J.A., I am hereby serving upon you our
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment regarding the above. I expect that if you
have objections, you will make them within five days as
provided by the rule. In the event that I do not
receive your objections within five days, I will submit
this judgment to the Court for entry.
On January 7, 1993, within the five day period, a letter was hand
delivered to plaintiff's counsel setting forth certain
objections.

This letter to plaintiff's counsel closed by asking

him to call to discuss the objections and attempt to resolve them
without Court involvement:
Please give me a call to discuss these objections.
If we cannot resolve all of them then I will proceed
with the filing of a formal objection. However, if we
can resolve the form of the pleadings without further
Court involvement, I am sure the Court would appreciate
it.
I look forward to hearing from you soon with
regard to the proposed language of the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. Thank you for
your courtesy.
No follow-up call or correspondence was ever received from
plaintiff s counsel.
Plaintiff's argument that the January 7, 1993, order is the
operative "final" order from which an appeal must be taken is
clearly incorrect.

Presenting the order to Judge Young for

signature on January 5, 1993, was a violation not only of Rule 4504, but of the specific representations made by counsel for

plaintiff that no order would be submitted for entry until after
the five period allowed by Rule 4-504 had expired without notice
of objection.
Unlike the first Judgment, plaintiff's proposed Amended
Judgment was not presented to the Court for signature until after
the time for objection had expired under Rule 4-504.

Therefore,

it is the only judgment that has been "filed" and entered as
defined by Rule 58A, U.R.C.P.
Plaintiff argues that the Amended Judgment constituted only
a "clerical correction" by adding an award of "costs".
Therefore, he argues that the January 27 order is automatically a
"nunc pro tunc" order and reverts back to the date of the January
7 order.

There is, of course, no language in the Amended

Judgment itself indicating that the order is entered "nunc pro
tunc".

Clearly, an amendment to add costs is more than a

"clerical" correction.
In Calfo v. D. C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986) the
Utah Supreme Court was faced with a similar argument.

On January

14, 1982, the trial court executed a document entitled "Summary
Judgment" which awarded Calfo the principal amount on a
promissory note, plus interest at six percent per annum and
attorneys' fees.

Defendant's counsel complained that he had not

been properly served with the form of judgment in accordance with
Rule 2.9(b) of the District Court Rules for Practice.

Efforts to

have plaintiff's counsel voluntarily withdraw the summary
judgment failed and defendant's counsel then moved the court to
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strike the judgment.

After a series of hearings on the motion to

strike, the trial court executed an order on June 7, 1983,
stating that "the Summary Judgment entered by the Court on
January 14, 1982, was properly signed and entered by the Court on
that date and is in full force and effect."

However, the court's

June 7, 1983, order did modify the earlier order by deleting the
awarded interest.

The defendant appealed and plaintiff objected

to the timeliness of the appeal, arguing that the June 7 order
"merely confirmed the judgment entered on January 14, 1982,
albeit as redrawn to eliminate interest."

717 P.2d at 699.

The

Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument.

Justice Zimmermann,

speaking for a unanimous court stated:
The appeal was timely taken. We have previously
held that unless Rule 2.9(b) of the District and
Circuit Court Rules of Practice has been complied with,
the judgment in question is not being "filed" within
the meaning of Rule 58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the time for taking an appeal from that
judgment under Rule 73(a) [now Rule 4(a) of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure] does not begin to run because
the judgment has not been properly "entered."
(citations omitted)

Id.
II.
EVEN IF THE JANUARY 7, 1993, JUDGMENT COULD
BE DEEMED "ENTERED" THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
DATED DECEMBER 21, 1992, IS TIMELY.
It is undisputed that defendant's Notice of Appeal dated
December 21, 1992, pre-dated entry of the final judgment in this
case.

The Notice of Appeal was filed after the Court issued its

Memorandum Decision, but before it entered a judgment.
Plaintiff's argument that this Notice of Appeal is "premature"
-

i i

and "ineffective to confer appellate jurisdiction" simply ignores
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah case law.
Rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly deals
with this exact situation.

It provides as follows:

(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order.
Except as provided in pairagraph (b) of this Rule, a
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of
the judgment or order of the trial court shall be
deemed treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
Thus, under Rule 58A, even if the January 7, 1993, order had been
"entered" the Notice of Appeal filed on December 21, 1992, is
deemed filed on January 7, 1993.
Plaintiff incorrectly cites the case of DeBry v. Fidelity
National Title Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah App. 1992) for
the proposition that "premature notice of appeal is ineffective
to confer appellate jurisdiction."

Memorandum in Support of

Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 11.
for no such proposition.

DeBry stands

The question presented by DeBry, was

whether a motion for relief from the judgment filed pursuant to
Rule 52(b) made the provisions of Rule 4(c) inapplicable and
required filing of a new notice of appeal under Rule 4(b), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Utah Court of Appeals in DeBry

held that because relief had been sought under Rule 52(b),
U.R.C.P., a new notice of appeal was required in accordance with
Rule 4 (b) .
Plaintiff also argues that the December 21, 1992, appeal was
"never perfected" because a docketing statement was not filed
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within twenty-one days.

Once again, plaintiff misreads the rule.

Rule 9(g) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in part:
Docketing statements which fail to comply with
this rule will not be accepted. Failure to comply may
result in dismissal of the appeal or the petition.
Clearly, this Court has the power to dismiss a case for
failure of the appealing party to comply with docketing
requirements.

Brooks v. Department of Employment Security, 736

P.2d 241 (Utah 1987) .

However, the filing of a docketing

statement is not "jurisdictional".

Dismissal of an appeal for

failure to timely file a docketing statement is discretionary as
the word "may" indicates.
At the time this Court inquired about the status of
defendant's appeal and the filing of a docketing statement,
defendant had pending a motion to set aside the January 7
Judgment as having been prematurely entered.

Additionally, an

Amended Judgment had been filed by plaintiff and mailed to the
Court.

Thus, it is completely understandable that no docketing

statement was filed.
CONCLUSION
The Judgment signed by Judge Young on January 5 and entered
by the Third District Clerk on January 7, 1993, must be deemed,
as a matter of law, to have not been "filed" or "entered".

Under

Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the Judgment
should not have been presented to the Court for a signature at
all, because plaintiff's counsel had been timely notified of
objections to the form of the judgment.

More importantly, the

Judgment could not have been properly presented to the Court for
signature until January 8, 1993, even if objections had not been
filed.
The only final judgment that has been properly filed and
entered is the Amended Judgment dated January 27, 1993.
Appellate's Notice of Appeal is, therefore, timely.
Even if plaintiff's argument was correct and the January 7,
1993, Judgment was the only final order, appellant's December 21,
1992, Notice of Appeal would be timely.

It would be deemed to

have been filed on the day of entry of the final judgment,
January 7, 1993, pursuant to Rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition is without merit
and should be denied.
Dated this rX

day of April, 1 9 9 3 ^
WILLIAMS 8c H"

r
By

AA^
DENNIS C. FERGUSON
Attorneys for Defendant
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State of Utah

)

: ss
County of Salt Lake )
Dennis C. Ferguson, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

I am counsel for defendant/appellant in this matter.

2.

Attached to this Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition are true and correct
copies of correspondence received by me from Daniel Darger and
copies of correspondence sent by me to Daniel Darger.
3.

I had no knowledge that the trial court had signed

plaintiff's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment on January 5 and entered said pleadings on January 7,
1993, until I spoke with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District
Court on January 20,

1993.

DENN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s r y

day v of April,

1993.
Notary Public
,
HEATHER BARNEY
!
1231 Warnock Avenue I
'tL-ka City, Utah 84106 :
• \-amission Expires *
:ii 19. 1995
i
5
.-to of Utah

c

J

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of

19701
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ah

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:

SS .

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Heather Barney, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant
herein; that she served the VERIFIED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION in Case No. 920599
before the Utah Supreme Court upon the parties listed below by
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed
to:
Daniel D. Darger
32 Exchange Place, Suite #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Parker M. Nielson
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Harold G. Christensen
Richard A. Van Wagoner
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

.

and causing the same to be mailed, postage prepaid, on the c>c
day of April, 1993.
Heather-^Barney
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

/-P

day^bf April,

1993.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

PARKER M. NIELSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
Vs.
DALE GOURLEY,
Defendant

Case No. 9003000302 and
9103000249
* * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on October 21 and 22, 1992. The
jury was waived, the court considered all remaining issues of fact and law presented by
counsel at trial. The plaintiff was present and represented both pro se as an attorney and
member of the bar and by his attorney, Daniel Darger. The defendant was present and
represented by his attorney, Dennis C. Furgeson. The court heard the testimony of the
witnesses as presented, received the evidence introduced both documentary and testimonial
and further heard the arguments of counsel and based on the foregoing renders its
MEMORANDUM DECISION
1.

This action arose through the conduct of the defendant on or about

September 8, 1990, wherein the defendant forcefully broke into a locked pen, sometimes
referred to by the defendant as a "trap," forcefully disturbed the enclosed nature of the pen,

tipped ii on its side, dismantled ceriain parts and took certain private property that was
located there without ihc consent of the owner.
2.

At the time the defendant engaged in such conduct, he knew or should

have known that the pen was being used or could have been used in connection with
appropriate sport dog which training had been conducted at that location for some years
prior. The defendant knew or should have known that the property was that of Parker
Nielson, the plaintiff in this action.
3.

The court finds that the defendant knew of the activities of dog

trainers in that area, both in training their dogs and in conducting field trials, and that the
defendant had openly expressed to those dog trainers his hostility and dislike for their
activities. Further, the defendant knew or should have been chargeable with the duty to
know that his predetermined opinions were improper as a wildlife resources enforcement
peace officer and that those individuals engaged in that aspect of sport training were fully
authorized to engage in such and the defendant's conduct in complicating their activities was
an inappropriate predilection and bias from which the defendant should have refrained.

The

court finds that it is not illegal to own, posses, or operate a bird pen equipped with recapture
cones nor is it illegal for a person to "take" any bird held in private ownership lawfully by
means of a recapture cone or pen.

2

4.

The court recognizes that it could occur that wild game could be so

captured and the pen owner would be obligated to release such "wild" game or unbanded
game when so captured. However, the testimony of the witnesses showed that there was
not expected to be any "chucker/partridge" wild game in this area and the defendant's own
testimony was that he had not seen any in this area but had seen some at approximately five
miles distance.
5.

The court finds that the defendant did act with malice, both in his

general views of the dog training activity and in particular to Mr. Nielson, whom he knew
or should have known, had an appropriate leasehold interest and the right to retake banded
birds purchased from a private grower and used in training.
6.

The court further finds that the defendant went beyond his appropriate

duties as a Wildlife Resources Officer by contacting the United States Forest Service and
the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry and their officials in seeking to have those
government agencies investigate the activities of the plaintiff and create problems for the
plaintiff in conducting his appropriate and lawful activities.
7.

The court finds that the defendant specifically attempted to diminish

the relationship of the plaintiff and others interested in dog training with the United States
Forest Service by taking Forest Service officials to the plaintiffs leased premises and in
attempting to persuade those officials that the plaintiff was trespassing on Forest Service
land and was conducting unlawful activities thereon.
3

8.

The court finds that the defendant's conduct was beyond the scope of

his appropriate duties and he should not have so acted.
9.

The court finds the defendant's conduct was wrongful and constituted

an effort to disregard the proclamations of the Wildlife Board and formed a sufficient basis
upon which the court could and does determine that there is an appropriate factual basis to
enjoin the defendant individually from such conduct both in relation to the plaintiffs
leasehold land interest and in relation to others similarly engaged in lawful activities
throughout the state.
10.

The court finds that the evidence established at trial shows that the

defendant acted in a wilful, malicious, and knowingly reckless way in disregard of the rights
of the plaintiff and his leasehold interest in the land in question. The court notes that the
uncontroverted evidence is that land useful for dog training of the type and description
herein is difficult to find, difficult to value, and difficult to effectively utilize for the purpose
of dog training because substantial acreage, upwards of the range of six square miles, is
ideally necessary for this kind of activity. This location is one of the very few potential
sites available to dog trainers in the state of Utah.
11.

The court finds that since the underlying ground leasehold interest

remains intact and there is no present indication that it will not be renewed, that no
damages should be assessed for the interference with the leasehold activities as a result of
the destruction of the pen.
4

12.

The court finds that the supervisors of the defendant in the Division of

Wildlife Resources knew or should have known of the defendant's dislike for the activities
of the plaintiff and others engaged in similar dog training activities and that they should
have appropriately disciplined the defendant prior to the desiruciion by the defendant of the
plaintiffs pen. In addition, the defendant's supervisor should have readily acknowledged
the defendant's misconduct and affirmatively tried in limit the defendant and should have
sought to remedy the situation with the plaintiff.
13.

The couri finds that the defendant's claim that the pen was a "trap"

under the law is not supported by the evidence and the defendant has failed to meet his
burden of proof in so establishing. The court finds that ihere were several indicators that
this was an appropriate recapture pen that were known or should have been known to the
defendant. They include but are not limited to the following:
a.

The pen was on land known used for upland game dog training

by Parker Niclson and others and should have caused the defendant to be
aware that recapture pens could be placed thereon.
b.

Ai the site of the pen, their were bands used for banding

properly purchased birds and though it may be argued by the defendant that
those bands could be placed on wild game so captured, the defendant should
have recalled that no wild "chucker/partridge" had been sighted in that area
by him and that before destroying the property, he at least could have taken
5

the band numbers and inquired whether those bands had been appropriately
sold to a licensed "chucker/pariridgc" bird owner.
c.

The recapture cones arc designed to recapture, without injury,

training birds and lhat should have given the defendant an obvious indication
that the pen could be their for a lawful purpose.
14,

The defendant had multiple indicators that the pen was there for a

lawful purpose and could have at least, without offensively, knocking it down, releasing the
birds contained therein and destroying the pen, made appropriate inquiries as to who the
owner might be, as to whose land it might be positioned on, and whether the pen could have
been placed there for a lawful purpose.
15.

The court further finds that the defendant has in the conduct of the

defense intentionally filed a false affidavit with the court and has intentionally taken a
defensive posture that was inappropriate under the circumstances in that the defendant or the
Division of Wildlife Resources should have readily offered to remove the defendant from
further enforcement activities on this property knowing full well that the defendant
maintained continuing hostility toward the plaintiff and his activities.
Based upon the foregoing, the court makes its

6

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991, is

affirmed herein.
2.

That the ownership, possession, and operation of the bird pens for

domestic birds properly equipped with recapture cones or devices is a lawful and proper use
under the laws of the state of Utah.
3.

Peace officers, including conservation officers such as the defendant

are prohibited from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by the plaintiff.
4.

The defendant in this case may not be heard to claim that the

plaintiffs pen was there for the intended capture of "wild" birds as it was being used
appropriately and within legal rights.
5.

The court finds that the damages to the pen and the replacement costs

assessed in damages to the defendant arc $2,300.(X).
6.
§ 78-27-56 of *
7.

The court finds tl^t the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's f^s under
\S;

DDd . —

t^/j

The court finds that it is appropriate to issue a permanent injunction

against this individual defendant from further activities on the plaintiffs leasehold land in
relation to Wildlife Management activities. This is not inconsistent with the defendant's
duties under the circumstances since the defendant has been transferred to Cedar City, and

7

should thus have no objection to avoiding any future confrontation associated with the
plaintiff and the land in question.
8.

The court declines to grant further punitive damages. The plaintiff is

awarded damages and fees as stated herein and costs incurred herein.
DATED this JJL day of > g t ^ K ^ ^ » ^

5AVID S. YOUNG
District CouaJ*Klge

8

1992.

DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A1061)
JODY K BURNETT (A04 9 9 )
WILLIAMS Sc HUNT
2 5 7 E a s t 2 0 0 S o u t h , S u i t e 500
P o s t O f f i c e Box 4 5 6 7 8
S a l t Lake Ciuy, Utah
84145-5678
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 521-5678

Attorneys for

Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DALE GURLEY,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Civil No. 90-0300-302
and
Civil No. 91-0300-249

Defendant.
Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant Dale
Gurley through counsel, Dennis* C. Ferguson of the law firm of
Williams & Hunt appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final
judgment of the Honorable David S. Young entered in this matter
on December 18, 1992.
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment entered on
December 18, 1992, as well as from all prior judgments entered in
favor of plaintiff, including without limitation Partial Summary
Judgment, entered in favor of plaintiff on June 24, 1991, as well
as the Order of Judge Moffat entered on January 31, 1992,
purporting to grant plaintiff an award of attorneys' fees as a
sanction.

Appeal is also taken from the trial court's denial of

defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment,
Motion for Relief from Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for
Relief from Order.
DATED this

^A

day of December, 1992.
WILl/lAMS & HUNT

k/lA^A
by_4
Dennis C. Ferguson
A t t o r n e y s f o r De
#17669

2

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:

ss .

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Heather Barney, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant
herein; that she served the attached Notice of Appeal in Civil
Nos. 90-0300-302 and 91-0300-249 before the Third District Court
for Tooele County, upon the parties listed below by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Daniel D. Darger
32 Exchange Place, Suite #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Parker M. Nielson
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

St
and causing the same to- be mailed, postage prepaid, on the
day of December, 1992.
leather Barzifey
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

day of

December, 1992.

AX^v*-x\rA

/-"'Ajr^^aYA
rfi^jl'/-'
V - • • : / _~

#72705.

Notary Public
ERIKC HACKING
257 East 200 South # 5C;
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411
My Commission Expire".
August 28, 19SD
StHtecf 0:*h

"1

a t e of Utah

LAW OFFICES OF

WILLIAMS & HUNT
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
2 5 " EAST 200 SOUTH SUITE 500
P O BOX 456~8
SALT LAKE CI TV UTAH 841 45-5678

DENNIS C FERGUSON

December 24, 1992

rELEPHONE'801- 5 : i - 5 f
FAX - 8 0 1 ' 3b4-45._

Daniel Darger, Esq.
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Nielson v Gurley
Civil No. 900 300 302

Dear Dan:
Thank you for sending me a copy of the proposed Judgment. There are two
areas that I think should be clarified in the Judgment. First, with regard to paragraph
3, I think the Judgment should reflect the Judge's opinion that plaintiff has not
suffered any damage as a result of the interference with contract. Second, in
paragraph 4, I think it should reflect that the $2,300 reflects the amount which the
Court found as the replacement cost for the pen and its contents. I would appreciate it
if you would make these changes and forward a copy of the Judgment with these
modifications to me for approval. Please let me know if you disagree with my
opinion that these items should be included so that I may make formal objections if
necessary. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
ILUAMS & HUNT

fs C. Ferguson
DCF:hb
cc:
Parker M. Nielson
James R. Soper
1347;

GENERAL PRACTICE WITH

DANIEL DARGER

TELEPHONE

ATTORNEY VT LAW

(S0H5M-6686

LITIGATION EMPHASIS

100 t 'ALMFRCIAL CLLB BULDING
*2 EXCHANGE PLACE
SALT LAKE CITY LTAH 84111

FAX
(801 i531-6690

December 22, 1992

Dennis Ferguson
Jody Burnett
Williams & Hunt
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
RE:

Nielson v. Gurley, et al
Civil No. 900 300 302

Dear Dennis:
Pursuant to Rule 4-504. C.J.A., I am hereby serving upon you our proposed Judgment
regarding the above. I expect that if you have objections, you will make them within five
days as provided by the Rule.
In the event that I do not receive your objections within five days, I will submit this
Judgment to the Court for entry.
Thank you for your cooperation.

Very truly yours.

DD/kl
cc: Parker Nielson
Enclosure
P-3dft.pri

DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

)

vs.

Civil Nos. 90-0300-302
91-0300-249

DALE GURLEY,

]
)

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

The Court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated
June 24, 1991, and having tried the issues remaining on October 21
and 22, 1992, sitting without a jury, and having entered its
Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992,
NOW, THEREFORE, based thereon the Court makes and enters the
following
J U D G M E N T
1.

The Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991,

is affirmed and adopted herein.
2.

Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of conversion.
3.

Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of interference with a contract.
4.

Damages are awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant in

the amount of $2,3 00.00
5.

Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any person acting

in concert or participation with him, is permanently enjoined from
further wildlife management activities on Plaintiff's leasehold
lands situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, either directly or
indirectly, described as follows:
Township
Section
Section
Section
6.

9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M
15: SW4, W2SE4
16: SE4
22: N2NW4

Plaintiff is awarded attorneys7 fees in the amount of

$15,000.00 under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
ENTERED this

day of December, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
(0633N)

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT
has been mailed, postage prepaid to Dennis Ferguson/Jody Burnett, P.O. Box 45678, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84145-5678, this *"LL day of ^ Y U

P5mot.pri

. 1992.

IN THE

THIRD DISTRICT COURT

TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
NIELSON, PARKER M
PLAINTIFF
VS
GURLEY, DALE

CASE NUMBER 900300302 PD
DATE 12/18/92
HONORABLE YOUNG, DAVID S.
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK NP

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. DARGER, DANIEL
D. ATTY. FERGUSON, DENNIS C

THE COURT THIS DATE ENTERED ITS MEMORANDUM DECISION IN THIS
MATTER. THE PLAINTIFF IS REQUESTED TO PREPARE CONSISTENT WITH
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION AND THE RECORD, FORMAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND A JUDGMENT. THE FUNDS PREVIOUSLY
RELEASED ARE INTENDED TO FORM A PART OF THE TOTAL RECOVERY.
THIS JUDGE WILL RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER UNTIL
THE FINAL DOCUMENTS RESOLVING THE CASE ARE IN PLACE. COUNSEL
ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE COURTESY COPIES OF THEIR PLEADINGS TO
THE COURT THROUGH DELIVERY IN SALT LAKE CITY. ANY HEARING
REQUESTED TO CONSIDER THE FINAL LANGUAGE WILL BE SET IN SALT
LAKE.
C.C. TO COUNSEL

GENERAL PRACTICE WITH
LITIGATION' EMPHASIS

DANIEL DARGER

TELEPHONE(801)531-6686

ATTORNEY \T LAW
100 COMMERCIAL CLL'B BUILDING
^2 EXCHANGE PLACE
SALT LAKE CITY. I T AH S4111

FAX:
(801)531-6690

December 30, 1992
HAND DELIVERED

Dennis Ferguson
Jody Burnett
Williams & Hunt
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
RE:

Nielson v. Gurley. et al
Civil No. 900 300 302

Dear Dennis:
Thank you for the clarifications set out in your letter of December 24, 1992.
However, since I served our previous proposed judgment. Judge Young has ordered that
findings of fact be prepared. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 4-504, C.J.A., I am hereby serving
upon you our proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment regarding the
above. I expect that if you have objections, you will make them within five days as provided
by the Rule. In the event that I do not receive your objections within five days, I will submit
this Judgment to the Court for entry.
I believe the clarifications set forth in your letter of the 24th are taken care of in the
findings. If you have other suggestions, please contact me.
As you know, a final judgment has not yet been entered in this case. Therefore, your
notice of appeal is premature and untimely. I suggest that we agree that it will be treated as
having been filed the day after a final judgment has been entered and notify Goeff Butler of
this fact so that he can calendar the appeal accordingly. This will avoid the necessity of a
motion to dismiss your appeal.
Thanks for the great party. Happy New Year!
Yery truly your

iUL^U
Daniel Darger
Attorney at Law
DD/d
cc: Parker Nielson
Enclosures

DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
]|

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]
)

Civil Nos. 90-0300-302
91-0300-249

DALE GURLEY,
Judge David S. Young
Defendant.

]

The court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated
June 24, 1991, and the Defendant having waived jury trial and
having tried the issues remaining on October 21 and 22, 1992,
sitting without a jury, the Defendant being present in person and
represented by his counsel, Dennis C, Ferguson, Esq., and the
Plaintiff being present in person and represented by his counsel,
Daniel Darger, Esq., and the parties having presented evidence,
both documentary and testimonial, and the court being fully
advised in the premises, and having entered its Memorandum
Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having directed the
Plaintiff to prepare formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and a Judgment consistent therewith by Minute Entry dated

December 18, 1992.
NOW, THEREFORE, the court makes and enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This action arose through the conduct of Defendant, Dale

Gurley ("Gurley" herein), admitted by Gurley in his Answers to
Interrogatories, his Affidavit herein, his Investigative Report
and his trial testimony, wherein on September 8, 1990, Gurley
forcefully broke into a locked pen, sometimes referred to by
Gurley as a "trap," forcefully disturbed the enclosed nature of
the pen, tipped it on its side, dismantled certain parts and took
certain private property located there without the consent of the
owner.
2.

At the time Gurley engaged in such conduct he knew, or

should have known, that the pen was used or could have been used
in connection with appropriate sporting dog training, and that
such training had been conducted at that location for a period of
years previously, and knew or should have known that the property
was that of Plaintiff.
3.

The court finds that Gurley knew of the activities of dog

trainers in the area where the pen was located, both in training
their dogs and in conducting field trials, and that Gurley had
openly expressed to those dog trainers his hostility and dislike
for their activities.

The court finds, further, that Gurley knew

or was chargeable with duty to know that his predetermined
opinions were improper as a wildlife resources enforcement peace
officer, including because of the matters found as facts at
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7.

The court finds that Gurley went beyond his appropriate

duties as a Wildlife Resources Officer by contacting the United
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry,
and their officials, in seeking to have those government agencies
investigate Plaintiff and create problems for the Plaintiff in
conducting his appropriate and lawful activities.
8.

The court finds that Gurley specifically attempted to

diminish the relationship of the plaintiff and others interested
in dog training with the United States Forest Service by taking
Forest Service officials to Plaintiff's leased premises and
attempting to persuade those officials that Plaintiff was
trespassing on forest land and was conducting unlawful activities
thereon.
9.

The court finds that Gurley7s conduct was beyond the scope

of his appropriate duties and he should not have so acted.
10.

The court finds that Gurley's conduct was wrongful and

constituted an effort to disregard the proclamations of the
Wildlife Board and formed a sufficient basis upon which the court
could and does determine that there is an appropriate factual
basis to enjoin Gurley individually from such conduct, both in
relation to Plaintiff's leasehold land in the vicinity of Vernon,
Utah, and in relation to any persons engaged in lawful dog
training activities elsewhere in the State of Utah.
11.

The court finds that the evidence established at trial

that Gurley acted in a wilful, malicious, and knowingly reckless
way in disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and his leasehold
interest in the land in question.
4
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15.

The court finds that there were several indicators that

Plaintiff's recapture pen was appropriate and lawful which were
known or should have been known to Gurley, including but not
limited to the following:
a.

The pen was on land Gurley knew was used for upland

game dog training by Plaintiff and others, and Gurley knew or
should have been aware that recapture pens could properly be
placed thereon.
b.

Bands used for banding live game birds, lawfully

acquired, when used for dog training were found by Gurley at
the site of the pen.
c.

Despite Gurley's arguments that the bands could be

placed on wild birds, which were not lawfully acquired, Gurley
knew or should have recalled that no wild Chukar Partridge had
been seen by him in the area where the pen was located.
d.

Gurley should have inquired, before destroying

Plaintiff's property, if the bands had been sold by or to a
licensed Chukar Partridge owner for appropriate use in dog
training.
/e,.

Gurley knew, or should have known, and could have

observed that the recapture cones are designed to recapture
training birds without injury and it should therefore have
been obvious to him that the pen was-maiivfeairied for a proper
purpose.
\<\

16.

Gurley had multiple indicators that Plaintiff's pen was

there for a lawful purpose and was obligated, including for the
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3.

Peace officers, including Conservation Officers such as

Defendant, are prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §
23-20-15 from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by
Plaintiff.
4.

Defendant may not contend that Plaintiff's recapture pen

was there for or intended to capture "wild" birds as it was being
used appropriately and within legal rights.
5.

The court determines that the facts establish the elements

of conversion.
6.

The court determines that the facts establish the elements

of interference with a contract, consisting of Plaintiff's lease
agreement with the State of Utah.
7.

The court finds that the damages to the pen and

replacement costs assessed in damages to the Defendant are
$2,300.00.
8.

The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's

fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 of $15,000.00.
9.

The court finds and determines that the damages resulting

from Defendant's interference with Plaintiff's contract rights are
difficult or impossible to determine, including because
Plaintiff's lease and the uses to which it was being put are
unique, have no market value and cannot be compensated for in
money damages, within the meaning and intent of System
Inc.

v.

Dixon,

Concepts,

669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983), and that

Defendant's wrongs are of a continuing character, the nature,
extent and value of which can be estimated only by conjecture, and
that the acts of Defendant are continuing or are threatened to
8
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DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT' COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,

]

Plaintiff,

;i

Defendant.

]i
i
]
i
]

vs.
DALE GURLEY,

JUDGMENT
Civil Nos. 90-0300-302
91-0300-249
Judge David S. Young

The Court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated
June 24, 1991, and having tried the issues remaining on October 21
and 22, 1992, sitting without a jury, and having entered its
Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having entered
formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based thereon
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court makes and enters the following
J U D G M E N T
1.

The Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991,

is affirmed and adopted herein.
2.

Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of conversion.
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GENERAL PRACTICE WITH
LITIGATION EMPHASIS

DANIEL DARGER

TELEPHONE:
(801)531-6686

ATTORNEY AT LAW
100 COMMERCIAL CLL'B BUILDLNG
32 EXCHANGE PLACE
SALT LAKE CITY. LTAH 8411 i

FAX:
(801)531-6690

December 30, 1992
HAND DELIVERED

The Honorable David S. Young
Third District Judge
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
RE:

Nielson v. Gurley
Civil No. 900300302 and PD910300249 PD

Dear Judge Young:
Enclosed are our findings and conclusions and form of judgment, pursuant to your
minute entry dated December 18, 1992.
We have attempted to conform the language in the findings and conclusions to your
Memorandum Decision of December 18, 1992 as nearly as possible, adding only those
matters necessary to implement the decision which are fairly implied. For your convenience,
and for the convenience of counsel, those additions consist of the appropriate language of an
injunction in paragraph 9 of the conclusions of law and judgment, viz., inadequacy o the legal
remedy and prohibiting action in "concert or participation" with Gurley, individually. We felt
that while this is the effect of an injunction, even if not stated, it should be made explicit so
that the person enjoined is on notice of its effect.
We have also added conclusions of law at paragraphs 5 and 6, which appear to fairly
implied and necessary to indicate what claims have been decided. Finding of fact number 14
is in the language of the Court, but broken into five subparagraphs. We have added reference
to the definition of "take" or "trapping" in finding of fact number 5, which seemed necessary
to conform to the evidence and complete the thought expressed by the Court. There may be
other word changes, and some paragraphs may have been divided into two findings, but no
changes of substance.

We will appreciate -: > ^o> u:., (! »; ..i.^ niiuui^- ,oiKi .-.l^ib J . . . j , ^ ^ . ; ut after
Mi Ferguson has an oppi nunii) lu present any objections Ir m:i\ u • .*

Enclosures
ec Parker Nielsen, Esq.
P' ~nis C Ferguson, Esq..

LAW OFFICES OF

WILLIAMS & HUNT
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
257 EAST 200 SOUTH , SUITE 500
P O. BOX 45678
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5678
ENNIS C FERGUSON

January 7, 1993

Daniel Darger, Esq.
32 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678
FAX (801) 364-4500

Hand Delivered

Nielson v Gurlev, Civil No. 900 300 302
Form of Judgment, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Dear Dan:
I was out of town on vacation from December 28 through January 5, 1993. On
my return to the office on January 6, 1993, I reviewed your correspondence of
December 30 and the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment which you enclosed therewith.
With regard to the Judgment, I reiterate my clarifications set forth in my letter
of December 24. I believe the Judgment itself should make clear that the damages are
awarded for the damage to the pen and that there have been no additional damages
arising out of the interference with contract.
With regard to your proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, I have
the following objections. References are made to the paragraph numbers in the
proposed Findings:
4.
This paragraph was not a part of Judge Young's Memorandum Decision.
While the legal conclusion set forth therein my be extrapolated from the Memorandum
Decision or from prior rulings, it is my view that the Findings should be restricted to
those actually determined by the Court as set forth in the Memorandum Decision.
13. The last sentence of paragraph 13 states "the Court further finds that the
supervisors of Gurley". . . . Judge Young's Memorandum Decision (1f 12) refers to
"defendant's supervisor should have readily acknowledged. . . . " The Court was
clearly referring to Officer Gurley's immediate supervisor and not "supervisors" as a
group. This can be corrected by simply adopting the precise language from paragraph
12 of the Court's Memorandum Decision.

Daniel Darker. Hsu.
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Daniel Darger, Esq.
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January 7, 1993

before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed
after such entry and on the day thereof. At any rate, I think we can take care of this
procedural glitch without difficulty.
I look forward to hearing from you soon with regard to the proposed language
of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. Thank you for your
courtesy.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAMS & HUNT

DCF:hb
cc:
Parker M. Nielson
James R. Soper
Dale Gurley
13473
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.ei:

Plaintiff and App e 1 1 o <*
13, i 1 e i ;u !"1 ey,
Defendant dnc

No. 920599
900300302

Dear Mr. Burnett :
The record in the above-referenced case was due
January 7, 1993, and has not been filed. We do not have notice
from you that a transcript has been ordered and paid for in
accordance with Rule'11(e)(1) and (4), of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Proced-:^ . nor do we have noti ce that the transcript
u
. ,; requ I re- *
1! ... ..\'. joir^-i, •,.; w'ai.i lac luuH- siatea rule, would
you kindly ..end his office a copy of trie written request for
transcript or notice that the transcript is ot required which
will clea K
^
i.-^.-o")- i" +-hir imt'-rLr.^ess .uio deiduii is taken care of within ten days
tue case wilJ 1< iic^-ic^^n *-> \ - <-- •-<-- -rose- urion.
Respectful 1"

Je^ffrp'
Clerk
GTH/ n.;

LAW OFFICES OF

WILLIAMS & HUNT
A, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
257 EAST 200 SOUTH . SUITE 500
P.O. BOX 45678
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841 45-5678
>ENNIS C. FERGUSON

January 20, 1993

Geoffrey J. Butler
Supreme Court Clerk
State of Utah
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678
FAX (801) 364-4500

Hand Delivered

Nielson v. Gurley
Civil Nos. 920599 and 900300302

Dear Mr. Butler:
Thank you for your letter of January 13, 1993, and for discussing with me
today the status of the Notice of Appeal which I filed on behalf of Dale Gurley. I
want to briefly review the procedural status of this case, which will serve to explain
why we have not proceeded further at this time with the filing of a docketing
statement.
On December 18, 1992, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision, a
copy of which I attach hereto. At the time I received the Memorandum Decision I
could not ascertain from the pleading itself whether the Court intended it to constitute
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. In order to protect my
client's interest, I filed a Notice of Appeal on December 21, 1992.
I filed the Notice of Appeal not only to comply with the thirty-day requirement
but also because I filed at the same time a Motion for Supersedeas Relief, asking the
trial court to stay execution on the judgment pending appeal. At the same time I filed
the requisite security.
After the Notice of Appeal was filed, Judge Young entered a Minute Entry
directing that plaintiffs counsel prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a
Judgment, submit these pleadings to me for approval and then to the Court for entry.
Based upon the trial court's subsequent action, it is now clear that he did not intend
his Memorandum Decision to constitute the final order in this matter.

Geoffrey J. Butler

•?

January 20, 1993

lo date, the ti ial coui t has not entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusion s of
Law and Judgment Thus, the order currently appealed from, is not final.
As I read Rule 4 (c). I J tah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the notice of appeal in
this case will be treated as filed after the entry of the Judgment "and on the day
thereof".
However, in the e\ ent that post-trial n lotions are filed pursuant to Rule 50( b),
.Rule 52(b) or Rule 59, the current Notice of Appeal would have no effect. Rule 4(b)
provides that "a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any [such] motions
si lall have no effect" and requires a new notice of appeal to be filed "within the
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of
[such a] motion".
Because a final judgment has not been entered and, theoretically at least,
motions under Rules 50, 52 or 59 could be filed after entry of such judgment, it is
i mpossible to know at this point whether the current Notice of Appeal will be effective
under Rule 4(c) or whether a new notice of appeal will need to be filed as provided by
Rule 4(b). For this reason, I respectfully ask that the Court hold this appeal \r
abeyance until further action has been, taken by the trial coui t ' ••:' l -• - * •
Supreme Court notified of the status of the case,
If for any reasoi l you believe the procedure I have suggested is nnl appropriate,
I would appreciate your so advisi ng. Thank you.
Very truly yours,

D^his
DCFihb
enclosures
cc:
•.:. ;e^ I L«. ,vr
Parkei V
Unne< R ^ p<

J~a'uuv

DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone:
(801) 531-6686
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150

0~

„
'
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Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil Nos, 90-0300-302
91-0300-249

vs.
DALE GURLEY,

Judge David S. Young
Defendant.

The court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated
June 24, 1991, and the Defendant having waived jury trial and
having tried the issues remaining on October 21 and 22, 1992,
sitting without a jury, the Defendant being present in person and
represented by his counsel, Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq-, and the
Plaintiff being present in person and represented by his counsel,
Daniel Darger, Esq«, and the parties having presented evidence,
both documentary and testimonial, and the court being fully
advised in the premises, and having entered its Memorandum
Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having directed the
Plaintiff to prepare formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and a Judgment consistent therewith by Minute Entry dated

December 18, 1992*
NOW, THEREFORE, the court makes and enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This action arose through the conduct of Defendant, bale

Gurley ("Gurley" herein), admitted by Gurley in his Answers to
Interrogatories, his Affidavit herein, his Investigative Report
and his trial testimony, wherein on September 8, 1990, Gurley
forcefully broke into a locked pen, sometimes referred to by
Gurley as a "trap," forcefully disturbed the enclosed nature of
the pen, tipped it on its side, dismantled certain parts and took
certain private property located there without the consent of the
owner.
2.

At the time Gurley engaged in such conduct he knew, or

should have known, that the pen was used or could have been used
in connection with appropriate sporting dog training, and that
such training had been conducted at that location for a period of
years previously, and knew or should have known that the property
was that of Plaintiff.
3.

The court finds that Gurley knew of the activities of dog

trainers in the area where the pen was located, both in training
their dogs and in conducting field trials, and that Gurley had
openly expressed to those dog trainers his hostility and dislike
for their activities.

The court finds, further, that Gurley knew

or was chargeable with duty to know that his predetermined
opinions were improper as a wildlife resources enforcement peace
officer, including because of the matters found as facts at

2

paragraphs D through F of the Partial Summary Judgment herein
dated June 24, 1991, which findings are reaffirmed and adopted
herein by reference thereto, and that persons engaged in the sport
of dog training were fully authorized by law to do so and that
Gurley's conduct in complicating their activities was an
inappropriate predilection and bias from which Gurley should have
refrained.
4.

The court finds that it is not illegal to own, possess, or

operate a bird pen equipped with recapture cones or devices, nor
is it illegal for a person to "take* any bird held in private
ownership lawfully acquired by means of a recapture pen.
5*

The court recognizes that it could occur that wild game

could become captured in a lawful device such as Plaintiff's pen
and that the definitions of "take* and "trapping" in the Fish and
Game code, their reference to "attempt[ing] any action" in
particular would obligate the owner to release such "wild" game
when so captured.

However, the testimony of the witnesses

established that there was no expectation that any wild Chukar
Partridge would be in the area of Plaintiff's pen and Gurley's own
testimony was that he had not seen any in the area of Plaintiff's
pen but had seen some at approximately five miles distance.
6.

The court further finds that Gurley acted with malice,

both in his general views of the dog training activity and in
particular to Plaintiff, whom he knew or should have known had an
appropriate leasehold interest and the right to retake game birds
lawfully acquired from a private wildlife farm and used in dog
training.
3

7.

The court finds that Gurley went beyond his appropriate

duties as a Wildlife Resources Officer by contacting the United
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry,
and their officials, in seeking to have those government agencies
investigate Plaintiff and create problems for the Plaintiff in
conducting his appropriate and lawful activities.
8.

The court finds that Gurley specifically attempted to

diminish the relationship of the plaintiff and others interested
in dog training with the United States Forest Service by taking
Forest Service officials to Plaintiff's leased premises and
attempting to persuade those officials that Plaintiff was
trespassing on forest land and was conducting unlawful activities
thereon,
9.

The court finds that Gurley's conduct was beyond the scope

of his appropriate duties and he should not have so acted.
10.

The court finds that Gurley's conduct was wrongful and

constituted an effort to disregard the proclamations of the
Wildlife Board and formed a sufficient basis upon which the court
could and does determine that there is an appropriate factual
basis to enjoin Gurley individually from such conduct, both in
relation to Plaintiff's leasehold land in the vicinity of Vernon,
Utah, and in relation to any persons engaged in lawful dog
training activities elsewhere in the State of Utah.
11.

The court finds that the evidence established at trial

that Gurley acted in a wilful, malicious, and knowingly reckless
way in disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and his leasehold
interest in the land in question.
4

The court finds that the

uncontroverted evidence established that land useful for dog
training of a suitable type and description is difficult to find,
difficult to value, and difficult to effectively utilize for the
purpose of dog training because substantial acreage, upwards of or
in the range of six square miles, is ideally riecessary for such
activity*

The court further finds that the evidence established

that the location of Plaintiff's leased land is one of a very few
potential sites available to dog trainers in the State of Utah
which are so suitable.
12.

The court finds that since Plaintiff's underlying

leasehold remains intact and there is no evidence of a present
indication that it will not be renewed, no damages should be
assessed for Gurley's interference with Plaintiffs leasehold
activities resulting from his destruction of Plaintiff's pen.
13.

The court finds that the supervisors of Gurley in the

Division of Wildlife Resources knew or should have known of
Gurley's dislike for the activities of Plaintiff and others
engaged in similar dog training activities and that they should
have appropriately disciplined Gurley prior to the destruction by
Gurley of Plaintiff's pen.

The court further finds that the

supervisors of Gurley in the Division of Wildlife Resources should
have readily acknowledged Gurley's misconduct and affirmatively
restrained Gurley and sought to remedy the effects of Gurley's
misconduct with Plaintiff.
14.

The court finds that Gurley's claim that Plaintiff's bird

pen was a "trap" is not supported by the evidence and Gurley has
failed to meet his burden of proof that the pen was used as a
5

"trap" or with the intent to "take" any "protected wildlife."
15.

The court finds that there were several indicators that

Plaintiff's recapture pen was appropriate and lawful which were
known or should have been known to Gurley, including but not
limited to the following:
a.

The pen was on land Gurley knew was used for upland

game dog training by Plaintiff and others, and Gurley knew or
should have been aware that recapture pens could properly be
placed thereon*
b.

Bands used for banding live game birds, lawfully

acquired, when used for dog training were found by Gurley at
the site of the pen*
c.

Despite Gurley's arguments that the bands could be

placed on wild birds, which were not lawfully acquired, Gurley
knew or should have recalled that no wild Chukar Partridge had
been seen by him in the area where the pen was located.
d.

Gurley should have inquired, before destroying

Plaintiff's property, if the bands had been sold by or to a
licensed Chukar Partridge owner for appropriate use in dog
training.
e.

Gurley knew, or should have known, and could have

observed that the recapture cones are designed to recapture
training birds without injury and it should therefore have
been obvious to him that the pen was maintained for a proper
purpose.
16.

Gurley had multiple indicators that Plaintiff's pen was

there for a lawful purpose and was obligated, including for the
6

reasons determined in the Partial Summary Judgment herein dated
June 24, 1991, which findings are reaffirmed and adopted herein by
reference thereto, before offensively knocking it down, releasing
the birds contained therein and destroying the pen, to make
appropriate inquiries as to who the owner might be, as to whose
land it might be situated on and whether the pen was there for a
lawful purpose.
17.

The court further finds that Gurley has intentionally

filed a false affidavit with the court and has intentionally
conducted a defense that was inappropriate under the circumstances
and was without merit and not asserted in good faith.
18.

The court further determines that the lack of merit and

bad faith of Gurley7s defense includes that Gurley or the Division
of Wildlife Resources and its representatives, including their
representatives herein, should have readily offered to remove
Gurley from further enforcement activities on Plaintiff's property
knowing full well that Gurley harbored continuing hostility toward
Plaintiff and dog training activities.
NOW, THEREFORE, the court makes and enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

The Partial Summary Judgment herein dated June 24, 1991,

is reaffirmed and adopted herein.
2.

The ownership, possession and operation of a bird pen for

live game birds, lawfully acquired, equipped with recapture cones
or devices, is lawful and proper under the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 23-17-2 and Utah Administrative Code § 608-4-3.

7

3.

Peace officers, including Conservation Officers such as

Defendant, are prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann- §
23-20-15 from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by
Plaintiff,
4.

Defendant may not contend that Plaintiff's recapture pen

was there for or intended to capture "wild* birds as it was being
used appropriately and within legal rights.
5.

The court determines that the facts establish the elements

of conversion*
6.

The court determines that the facts establish the elements

of interference with a contract, consisting of Plaintiff's lease
agreement with the State of Utah.
7.

The court finds that the damages to the pen and

replacement costs assessed in damages to the Defendant are
$2,300.00.
8.

The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's

fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 of $15,000.00.
9.

The court finds and determines that the damages resulting

from Defendant's interference with Plaintiff's contract rights are
difficult or impossible to determine, including because
Plaintiff's lease and the uses to which it was being put are
unique, have no market value and cannot be compensated for in
money damages, within the meaning and intent of System
Inc.

v, Dixon,

Concepts,

669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983), and that

Defendant's wrongs are of a continuing character, the nature,
extent and value of which can be estimated only by conjecture, and
that the acts of Defendant are continuing or are threatened to
8

continue, and that there is a need to enjoin and restrain
Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any persons acting in
concert or participation with him from further activities in
relation to Wildlife Management on Plaintiff's leasehold land in
the vicinity of Vernon, Utah, or from attempting to diminish the
relationship of Plaintiff and others interested in dog training,
including by attempting to persuade the United States Forest
Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry that their
activities are unlawful.

The court further finds that such an

injunction is not inconsistent with Defendant's duties under the
circumstances, since the evidence indicated that Gurley had been
transferred to Cedar City and thus should have no objection to
avoiding future confrontation with Plaintiff, dog trainers or the
land which is the subject of this suit.
10*

Plaintiff is awarded fees as stated herein, and costs

incurred herein.
ENTERED this

•—v
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BY THE COURT:

DAVID S . (YOUNG ]

rj

District \tourtyJuage
(0633N)

^
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DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
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PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,

i

Defendant.

;i
)
]
i
]

vs.
DALE GURLEY,

JUDGMENT
Civil NOS. 90-0300-302
91-0300-249
Judge David S. Young

The Court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated
June 24, 1991, and having tried the issues remaining on October 21
and 22, 1992, sitting without a jury, and having entered its
Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having entered
formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based thereon
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court makes and enters the following
J U D G M E N T
1.

The Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991,

is affirmed and adopted herein.
2.

Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of conversion.

3.

Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of interference with a contract.
4.

Damages are awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant in

the amount of $2,300.00
5.

Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any person acting

in concert or participation with him, is permanently enjoined from
diminishing or interfering with, or attempting to diminish or
Interfere with the relationship of Plaintiff and others interested
in dog training, including by attempting to persuade the United
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry
that their activities are unlawful, or from conducting further
wildlife management activities on Plaintiff's leasehold lands
situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, either directly or
indirectly, described as follows:
Township
Section
Section
Section
6.

9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M
15: SW4, W2SE4
16: SE4
22: N2NW4

Plaintiff is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of

$15,000.00 under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
ENTERED this ^

day of ^ ^ 3 ^ 1 ^ ^ 1 9 9 5 .
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S.
District
(0633N)
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Fax

Facts

FROM
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
47 SOUTH MAIN
TOOELE, UTAH 8 4 074
PHONE:

(801) 882-921.0

FAX NUMBER: (801) 882-0524

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PAGE(S) TO:

C7)

NAME
LOCATION
FROM

1£»±L^
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET

If you do not receive a.1.1 t h e plages p l e a s e c a l l back
S P E C I A L INSTRUCTIONS

ON COMMENTS

DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A10S1)
JODY K BURNETT (A04 99)
WILLIAMS Sc HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

MOTION TO
FINDINGS
CONCLUSIONS
JUDGMENT
JANUARY

SET ASIDE
OF FACT,
OF LAW AND
ENTERED
5, 1993

DALE GURLEY,
Civil No. 90-0300-302
and
Civil No. 91-0300-249

Defendant

Defendant, by and through his counsel, hereby moves to set
aside the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
entered by this Court on January 5, 1993.

The basis for this

motion is that the Court entered judgment prematurely and before
the time had expired for defendant to enter objections as to the
form of the Order.

Objections to the form of the Order were made

to plaintiff's counsel on January 7, 1993, and defendant's
counsel was never notified by counsel for plaintiff or the Court
that judgment had been entered.

Counsel for defendant learned of

the entry of judgment on January 20, 1993, when he called the
Clerk of the Court.

This motion is supported by a legal memorandum of even date
herewith.
DATED this

,Xl

day of January,, 1993.
WltLIAWS Sc HUNT/

//AAA

^Dennis C. Ferguson
Attorneys for Defenda/nt
#18219

2

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Heather Barney, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant
herein; that she served the attached MOTION TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ENTERED JANUARY 5, 1993,
in Civil Nos. 90-0300-302 and 91-0300-249 before the Third
District Court for Tooele County, upon the parties listed below
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Daniel D. Darger
32 Exchange Place, Suite #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Parker M. Nielson
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and causing the same to be mailed, postage prepaid, on the
day of January, 1993.
Heat Her Bar:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
January, 19 93.

A'

rtJ. ttfajP)

L
^Totafy P u b l.ic'
:
Residing in the State of Utah

...Jfif/V-';
-7 6c3t2..c";:

L—i^r^

«\!y Commissicn d
2*^30.1994*
StateofUtah

;<!
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DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
Attorneys for Plaintiff
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,

Plaintiff,
vs.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT

;
i
)

DALE GURLEY,
Defendant.

TO:

]
I
\i

;)

Civil Nos. 900 300 302
91-0300 249
Judge David S. Young

Defendant Dale Gurley and his counsel,
Dennis C. Ferguson
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the provisions of Rule

58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that Judgment was entered
herein by the Honorable David S. Young on January 5, 1993 and
entered by the Clerk of the above entitled court on January 7,
1993.

Certified copies of the Judgment and the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law entered by Judge Young are attached.
You should govern yourself accordingly.

DATED this < ^ * ^ day of January, 1993,

x
^Parker M. Nielson
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I Bailed a true copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, with attachments, firct claoo,
postage prepaid, this

& 2 fhtL day of January, 1993 to:

Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

/

(0656)

DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
Attorneys for Plaintiff
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
AMENDED JUDGMENT

]

DALE GURLEY,
Defendant.

TO:

]

]I

Civil Nos. 900 300 302
91-0300 249

;

Judge David S. Young

Defendant Dale Gurley and his counsel,
Dennis C. Ferguson
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the provisions of Rule

58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that Amended Judgment was
entered herein by the Honorable David S. Young on January 27,
1993.

A conformed copy of the Amended Judgment entered by Judge

Young is attached.
You should govern yourself accordingly.

DATED this 2nd day of February, 1993.

Parker M. Nielson
^
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT, with attachment,
this 2nd day of February, 1993 to:
Dennis C Ferguson, Esq,
Jody K. Burnett, Esq.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

./jy LLC{^

(0656)

y xc cd (if. ttt.c'/e

DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
;i

Plaintiff,

i
i

vs.

AMENDED JUDGMENT
Civil Nos. 90-0300-302
91-0300-249

DALE GURLEY,
i
]

Defendant.

Judge David S. Young

The Court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated
June 24, 1991, and having tried the issues remaining on October 21
and 22, 1992, sitting without a jury, and having entered its
Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having entered
formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based thereon
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court makes and enters the following
J U D G M E N T
1.

The Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991,

is affirmed and adopted herein,
2.

Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of conversion.

3.

Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of interference with a contract.
4.

Damages are awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant in

the amount of $2,300.00
5.

Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any person acting

in concert or participation with him, is permanently enjoined from
diminishing or interfering with, or attempting to diminish or
interfere with the relationship of Plaintiff and others interested
in dog training, including by attempting to persuade the United
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry
that their activities are unlawful, or from conducting further
wildlife management activities on Plaintiff's leasehold lands
situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, either directly or
indirectly, described as follows:
Township
Section
Section
Section
6.

9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M
15: SW4, W2SE4
16: SE4
22: N2NW4

Plaintiff is awarded costs, and attorneys' fees in the

amount of $15,000.00 under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56.
ENTERED this 27 ^ day of January, 1993.
B* THE COURT:

j£
DAVID S. YOUNG
District Court Judge
(0633N)

BRYCE E. ROE (2785)
36 South State Street, #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0202

yrtN

\&bjU

Sct-771
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DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
Attorneys for Plaintiff
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

S_ U M M Q N S_

)

JOHN P. SOLTIS, REED M.
STRINGHAM, III, DALE GURLEY,
TIMOTHY H. PROVAN, R. PAUL
VAN DAM, DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF
UTAH,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 920902406 CV

Judge David S. Young

)

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:
JOHN P. SOLTIS
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to file an answer in
writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the
above-entitled Court, and to serve upon or mail to Daniel Darger,
Esq. , 100 Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake

City, Utah 84111, or Parker M. Nielson, Esq., 655 South 200 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of said answer within twenty
(20) days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, a copy of
which is hereto annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this 29th day of April, 1992.
BRYCE E. ROE, ESQ.
DANIEL DARGER, ESQ.
PARKER M. NIELSON, ESQ.

''/fau^&r^
Bv /
<*l /{/ / '///
~7
Parker M. Nielson
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se
(0550N)
Serve Defendant at:
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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BRYCE E. ROE (2785)
36 South State Street, #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0202
DANIEL DARGER (0815)
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
Attorneys for Plaintiff
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
C O M P L A I N T

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN P. SOLTIS, REED M.
STRINGHAM, III, DALE GURLEY,
TIMOTHY H. PROVAN, R. PAUL
VAN DAM, DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF
UTAH,

C i v i l No.

Defendants.

Plaintiff complains of Defendants and alleges:
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of both Salt Lake City and Vernon

in the State of Utah and a citizen of the United States.
2.

Defendants John P. Soltis ("Soltis" herein) and Reed M.

Stringham, III, ("Stringham" herein) are residents of Salt Lake

County, State of Utah and, at all times alleged were Deputy
Attorneys General for the State of Utah and acted as legal counsel
for and agents of Defendant Dale Gurley with respect to
proceedings before the Third Judicial District Court for Tooele
County, Utah ("The Court* herein), in a case entitled Parker M.
Nielson vs. Dale Gurley, Docket No. 900 300 302. Soltis and
Stringham are sued herein in their individual capacities and not
in their official capacity as officers or employees of the State
of Utah.
3.

Defendant Dale Gurley ("Gurley" herein) is a resident of

Payson in the State of Utah and was, at all times alleged, a
Conservation Officer employed by the Division of Wildlife
Resources, Department of Natural Resources, State of Utah ("DWR"
herein), having peace officer authority.

Gurley is sued herein in

his individual capacity and not in his official capacity as an
officer or employee of the State of Utah.
4.

Defendant Timothy H. Provan ("Provan" herein) is a

resident of the State of Utah and, at all times alleged, was the
Director of DWR and the superior to Gurley with respect to
Gurley's conduct alleged.

Provan is sued in his individual

capacity, and in his representative and official capacity as an
officer or employee of the State of Utah.
5.

Defendant R. Paul Van Dam ("Van Dam" herein) is a resident

of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, and at all times alleged was the
Attorney General of the State of Utah and the superior to Soltis
and Stringham with respect to their conduct alleged.

Van Dam is

sued in his individual capacity, and in his representative and

official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Utah.
6.

The Division of Wildlife Resources, State of Utah ("DWR"

herein), is a governmental entity for the purposes of Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-2, existing under provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-34-3.
7.

The Attorney General of the State of Utah is a

governmental entity for the purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2,
existing under provisions of Constitution of Utah, Art. VII, § § 1
and 3, and Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8.

Concurrent jurisdiction of the above-entitled Court,

together with the courts of the United States, is available under
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343, this Complaint alleging
violations of various Acts of Congress providing for the
protection of civil rights, including the provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and by reason of the further facts alleged
herein that Defendants Soltis, Stringham, Gurley, Provan and Van
Dam, individually and in concert and conspiracy with other
persons, or by aiding, abetting and assisting the acts of others,
under color of various state statutes, ordinances, regulations,
customs or usages, caused the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States and the State of Utah and impeded, hindered,
obstructed or defeated the due course of justice in the State of
Utah with intent to deny Plaintiff the equal protection of the
laws or injure Plaintiff or his property including by acts done in
furtherance of a conspiracy to impede, obstruct or defeat the due
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course of justice and equal protection of the laws in violation of
said Acts of Congress, and failed to prevent or to aid in
preventing wrongs mentioned in 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
9.

Venue is proper in the above-entitled Court under

provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30*17, and because various acts
complained of occurred in Salt Lake County.
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY/WRITTEN UNDERTAKING
10.

Provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah

Code Ann. § 63-30-1, £t. seq., and provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§
78-11-10 and 63-30-19 concerning the filing of an undertaking to
pay costs have no application herein, this action asserting claims
under provisions of federal law as to which the states are without
power under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
to impose conditions or requirements not prescribed by Congress.
11.

Provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act do not

apply to this action for the reasons that Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-4(3)(b)(i) and (4) exempt acts performed with malice, it
having been adjudicated by The Court in said Docket No. 900 300
302 that Gurley acted with malice with respect to the matters
alleged herein, and it being alleged that Soltis, Stringham, Provan
and Van Dam participated in Gurley's malice and deception on The
Court; because actions arising out of contractual rights with the
State of Utah are alleged, and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) waives
governmental immunity and the requirement of filing a notice of
claim as actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations;
because Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 waives immunity from suit for
the recovery of damages to private property, this action alleging

such damage; and because Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6 waives
governmental immunity for suits to recover property, this action
alleging deprivation of interests in real and personal property
and rights to recovery thereof.
12.

To the extent that said notice of claim and written under-

taking provisions may apply to claims herein not based upon federal
law and not otherwise exempt# Plaintiff has complied with the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, ££. seq,, by
filing notice of claim, thereby satisfying the requirements of all
applicable statutes of limiations and the Governmental Immunity
Act, including on December 4, 1991, a copy of which is attached
hereto.

Said Notice was timely, being within one (1) year of

April 18, 1991, which was the first indication that Gurley, Soltis
or Stringham claimed that Gurley's conduct was pursuant to issuance
of a citation or otherwise pursuant to peace officer authority,
and said notice of claim was denied, within the meaning and intent
of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14, neither the State of Utah nor its
insurance carrier having notified Plaintiff in writing of approval
or denial of the claim.
13.

Provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-11-10 and 63-30-19

concerning the filing of an undertaking to pay costs do not apply
to the matters alleged, this action asserting claims under
provisions of federal law as to which the states are without power
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to
impose conditions or requirements not prescribed by Congress, and
for the dual reasons that Gurley did not indicate, in any way,
that his conduct alleged herein occurred during the performance of
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his duties as a peace officer or as an employee of the State of
Utah or was within the scope of his employment or under color of
authority until after suit had been initiated against him in said
Docket No. 900 300 302, and compliance with said provisions is not
required under provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) as to
actions sounding in contract.

To the extent that said provisions

may apply to claims herein not based on federal law, or to Soltis,
Stringham, Provan and Van Dam, Plaintiff has nevertheless obtained
an order of the above-entitled Court fixing the amount of
undertaking, should said provisions apply, and a written
undertaking signed by two (2) sureties, which undertaking is
attached to or filed contemporaneously with this Complaint.
BACKGROUND FACTS
14.

At all times alleged Plaintiff had property rights, in

common with Messrs. Leslie Foote and Roy N. Byrd, by virtue of
Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 with the State of Utah,
Division of State Lands and Forestry, in the following lands
situated in Tooele County, State of Utah:
Township
Section
Section
Section

9 South, Range 6 West. SLB&M
15: SW4, W2SE4
16: SE4
22: N2NW4

Said lease is for the specific purpose of "releasing and
propagating game birds for hunting dog training and conducting
non-commercial competition of hunting dogs,"
15.

The lessees as to said Lease No. 798, acting by and

through Leslie Foote, applied to DWR for and were issued a
Certificate of Registration for a Private Wildlife Farm at T.9S.,
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R.6W., SLB&M, Sec. 15, 16, 22, Tooele Co., which is inclusive of
the lands embraced by Lease No. 798.

Said Certificate of

Registration, No. PWF-SLO-129, was pursuant to an application for
the purpose of "dog training and incidental propagation."
16.

On September 8, 1990, and for a period of more than one

year prior thereto, Plaintiff owned and maintained a locked and
secure pen and related facilities for raising and possessing live
game birds on or in conjunction with said Lease No. 798 and said
Certificate of Registration, No. PWF-SLO-129, outfitted or
equipped with devices, known as "recall cones," for maintaining
possession and control over privately owned game birds outside of,
but in near proximity to, the pen.
17.

DWR has issued a "Proclamation for the Possession of Live

Game Birds," provisions of which are controlling as to all
persons, including peace officers or persons assisting peace
officers and those holding a Certificate of Registration for a
Private Wildlife Farm or otherwise possessing live game birds.
Said proclamation contains the following provisions pertinent to
this Complaint:

(a) A "private wildlife farm" is defined as
"[a]n enclosed place such as, but not limited
to. a pen or aviary, where privately owned game
birds are propagated or kept and which
enclosure restricts the birds from escaping
into the wild." (Emphasis added.)
(b) "A certificate of registration IS NOT
required for a person to acquire live game
birds for the purpose of training dogs . . ..."
(Emphasis in original.)
(c) "Any peace officer or special function
officer may request persons engaged in
activities covered under these rules to exhibit
any documentation related to such activities
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(including, but not limited to, certificate of
registration, permit, health certificate, bill
of sale, proof of ownership), any game birds,
and any device, apparatus and facility used for
activities covered under these rules.*
18.

The Wildlife Resources Code of Utah, Utah Code Ann.

§ 23-13-14, and the Proclamation for the Possession of Live Game
Birds, Utah Administrative Code R608-4-3, provide that "live gam
birds may not be released or abandoned without first obtaining
written authorization from the Director of the [Wildlife
Resources] Division."
19.

Various provisions of The Wildlife Resources Code of

Utah, including Utah Code Ann. § 23-17-2, permit, inter

alia,

persons legally possessing live game birds to restrict them and
prevent their release or abandonment into the wild, as they are
required to do by said provisions alleged in the preceding
paragraph, by "taking" or "trapping," including by recall pens,
"any birds . . . held in private ownership legally acquired." Tl
process of recalling, or trapping, birds in private ownership bu
which may be temporarily out of a holding pen for dog training
also constitutes the maintenance, control and constructive
possession of and over domestic game birds acquired from a legal
source.
20.

Said Proclamation for Taking of Upland Game was adopted

by the State of Utah Wildlife Board providing, in pertinent part
as follows:
DAMAGE OF PROPERTY . . . [I]t is unlawful
for any person, without the consent of the
owner or person in charge of any privately
owned land, to tear down, mutilate or destroy
any . . . fence or other enclosure on this
privately owned land. . . .
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"Privately owned land" includes leasehold interests in land.

Said

provision is identical with Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-15.
CONDUCT OF GURLEY
21.

On September 8, 1990, Gurley did tear down# mutilate or

destroy said pen in disregard of Plaintiff's rights thereto and in
disregard of the Constitution and lavs of the United States and
the laws of the State of Utah and proclamations of the Wildlife
Board alleged herein.
22.

On September 8, 1990, Gurley destroyed, or converted to

his own use, the following described personal property of
Plaintiff located in or in conjunction with said bird pen:
Approximately fifteen (15) bands for marking
game birds, two (2) game bird feeders, one bag
of game bird feed and one plastic container
containing game bird feed, two (2) game bird
watering devices, one float control for
livestock watering and related hoses and
fixtures for watering wildlife (not limited to
game birds) and domestic birds and at least one
live game bird (Chukar Partridge) together with
at least six (6) other game birds (Chukar
Partridge) which were under Plaintiff's
constructive possession and control by virtue
of said game farm facilities and equipment but
which are now lost by reason of the removal of
said "call" bird.
23.

Gurley did not request Plaintiff, at any time, to exhibit

any documentation, including any certificate of registration,
permit, bill of sale or proof of ownership of any game birds or
any device, apparatus and facility used or related to such
activities.
24.

The conduct of Gurley was not within the scope of or

pursuant to peace officer authority, including because it was not
pursuant to a warrant, or in connection with any arrest of
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Plaintiff or any other person, including by issuance of any
citation to Plaintiff or any other person for any alleged
violation of law.
25.

Gurley's conduct was under color of various statutes,

ordinances, regulations, customs or usages of the State of Utah.
Gurley has in fact alleged in Docket No. 900 300 302 in the Third
Judicial District Court for Tooele County, Utah, that his conduct
"was . . . under color of any statute or regulation of the State
of Utah, or pursuant to any custom or usage of the Department of
Wildlife Resources . . . "
26.

The wrongfulness of Gurley's conduct is an adjudicated

fact by virtue of the Partial Summary Judgment entered by The
Court in said Docket No. 900 300 302, determining that "Peace
officers, including Conservation Officers such as [Gurley], are
prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-15 from
breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by Plaintiff and
that "the conduct of [Gurley] was therefore without probable cause
or authority under provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1 that
Conservation Officers shall follow the same procedure
in . . . enforcement of this code, as other peace officers" and
the determination of The Court dated December 23, 1991, that the
sworn statement of Gurley to the contrary "is riddled with
untruths."
27.

From time to time over a period of years prior to

September 8, 1990, commencing on or about December 30, 1986,
Gurley has made public statements to the effect that he would
interfere with and prevent Plaintiff's conduct of hunting dog
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training near Vernon by causing Plaintiff to be cited, arrested or
prosecuted over matters which he, Gurley, would initiate or cause
to be initiated.
28.

The conduct of Gurley alleged was performed with actual

malice toward Plaintiff, including for the reasons alleged in the
next preceding paragraph.

Gurley's malice is an adjudicated fact

by reason of the Partial Summary Judgment of The Court in said
Docket No. 900 300 302 determining that "Defendant was sufficiently familiar with the laws and regulations concerning possession of
live game birds, and the proper procedure for questioning the
authority of persons in possession of live game birds, to create
an inference that his conduct was with malice towards dog trainers
as a group or Plaintiff in particular" (emphasis added) and the
determination of The Court dated January 31, 1992, that the sworn
statement of Gurley to the contrary "is riddled with untruths" and
"for the purpose of denying Plaintiff's rights in [said] litigation wrongfully and without just cause or excuse."
CONDUCT OF SOLTIS, STRINGHAM AND GURLEY
29.

On October 22, 1990, Gurley alleged, truthfully and under

oath, that he "made no arrest of Plaintiff, including bv issuance
of anv citation for any alleged violation of law, on September 8,
1990, or at anv time thereafter . . . ." (emphasis added) and
Stringham filed Gurley's allegation with The Court in said Docket
No. 900 300 302.
30.

Subsequent to the acts alleged herein on September 8,

1990, and October 22, 1990, Plaintiff is informed and believes,
and on such information and belief alleges, that Defendants
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Soltis, Stringham and Gurley entered into a conspiracy to conceal
the wrongfulness of the conduct of Gurley and to obstruct and
impede Plaintiff in the assertion of his rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Utah.
Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on information and
belief alleges, that said conspiracy included the simulation and
backdating by Gurley of investigative reports and legal process in
the form of a citation purporting to charge Plaintiff with
violations of law; false swearing by Gurley to an affidavit
stating that his conduct was a proper exercise of peace officer
authority and pursuant to issuance by him of a citation charging
Plaintiff with violations of law on September 13, 1990, though in
truth and in fact no citation was ever issued; and filing the
false affidavit, backdated investigative reports and simulated,
false and fictitious process with the courts of the State of Utah.
31.

Pursuant to said conspiracy, Gurley executed, under oath,

an affidavit on or about April 18, 1991 stating that Gurley
"issued a citation to plaintiff on or about September 13, 1990,"
that a "true and correct" copy of the citation was attached and
that Gurley "served" the citation on Plaintiff "by mailing it to
him" on or about September 13, 1990, each of which statements were
false.
32.

Said affidavit of Gurley dated April 18, 1991, was

prepared for him by Defendants Soltis and Stringham, either
directly or as agents of one another, and filed by Defendants
Soltis, Stringham and Gurley, either directly or as agents of one
another, with The Court in said Docket No. 900 300 302 on or about
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April 19, 1991 and at various times thereafter.

Said acts by

Soltis, Stringham and Gurley were pursuant to the conspiracy
alleged.
33.

The falsity of said affidavit dated April 18, 1991, was

acknowledged by Gurley, Soltis and Stringham in subsequent
admissions in said Docket No. 900 300 302, including by admissions
that "a citation, if issued, must include an appearance date and
that the appearance date must be not less than five nor more than
14 days from the date of issuance," and that "the citation, if
issued, must be filed with the appropriate court within five (5)
days," none of which conditions were satisfied.

For those

reasons, among others, the "citation" attached to said affidavit
dated April 18, 1991, was in fact a simulation, and without any
validity or effect.

The attachment of the simulated citation to

said affidavit and the filing of it with The Court was in pursuit
of the conspiracy.
34.

Said simulated citation attached to the affidavit dated

April 18, 1991, was in fact never mailed to Plaintiff but in fact
the "defendant's copy" thereof was given by Gurley to Soltis and
Stringham in October of 1990 and retained by them in their
possession at all material times thereafter.

Soltis and Stringham

therefore knew, or were chargeable with knowledge, at all material
times from and after early October of 1990, that the form of
citation attached to the Gurley affidavit of April 18, 1991, was a
simulation and that the simulated citation was not mailed to or
otherwise served on Plaintiff.

The acts of Soltis and Stringham

in retaining the simulated citation in their files and their

failure to reveal the true facts concerning it to Plaintiff and
The Court were further acts in pursuit of the conspiracy*
35.

The conduct of Soltis and Stringham in filing the

simulated citation with The Court and preparing said affidavit
falsely stating that the simulated citation had been issued by
mailing it to Plaintiff on or about September 13, 1990, was not in
the judicial phase of any criminal proceeding, but was an aspect
of Soltis and Stringham acting as attorneys for Gurley
investigating civil proceedings, and was therefore not immune from
provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986.
36.

At all times alleged Soltis and Stringham were obligated,

by provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
certify that every pleading "or other paper" filed by them had
been read by them and that "to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact . . . ."
37.

(Emphasis added.)

At all times alleged, Soltis and Stringham were further

obligated to act with candor to court and counsel, including by
provisions of Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah
State Bar Association (effective Jan. 1, 1988), including in
particular the following provision:
(4) . • . . If a lawyer has offered material
evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures,
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue
to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply
even if compliance requires disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
[Viz., requires breach of confidentiality.]
38.

At all times alleged, Soltis and Stringham were further

obligated by the commentary to said Rule 3.3, which provides that

"if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose
the existence of the client's deception to the court or to the
other party" even if the disclosure results in "a prosecution for
perjury," and that if the lawyer fails to do so "the alternative
is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby
subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is
designed to implement."
39.

At all times alleged, Soltis and Stringham were further

obligated by the provisions of DR 7-102(A)(4), ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall
not "knowingly use" perjured testimony or false evidence and that
a lawyer "who receives information clearly establishing that . . .
his client has . . . perpetrated a fraud upon . . . a tribunal
shall [if the client does not rectify the situation] reveal the
fraud . . . to the . . . tribunal," and by the provisions of DR
7-102(A)(6) that "a lawyer shall not participate in the creation
or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that
the evidence is false."
40.

At all times alleged, Soltis and Stringham were public

prosecutors bound in the discharge of their office of public trust
to behave with scrupulous fairness. That obligation is imposed by
ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-14, which provides
that "[w]ith respect to evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has
responsibilities different from those of a lawyer in private
practice" and may "not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case
. . . ," and by numerous authorities holding that the prosecutor

is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest . • • is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice be done. As such,
he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law. . . . He may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he
is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is
as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one. Berger v.
United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934).
41.

Over more than seven (7) months subsequent to the filing

of said affidavit and simulated citation, commencing shortly after
the affidavit was filed and continuing through and including
October 14, 1991, Plaintiff informed Soltis and his superior,
Defendant Van Dam, that the affidavit dated April 18, 1990, was
false and made repeated demands upon Van Dam, Soltis and Stringham
that they retract or otherwise disavow obvious perjury contained
in the affidavit pursuant to their professional obligations
alleged in the six (6) preceding paragraphs.

Plaintiff received

no response of any description from Soltis and neither Soltis,
Stringham, nor Van Dam undertook to withdraw said affidavit or
advise the court of the true facts in regard to the simulated
citation.

Refusal of Soltis, Stringham and Van Dam in that regard

was for the purpose of avoiding disclosure of Gurley's perjury and
avoiding disclosure of the participation of Soltis and Stringham
in composing and filing the perjury with the Court and was
pursuant to the conspiracy,
42.

Soltis and Stringham disregarded their obligations as set

forth in each of the preceding seven (7) paragraphs.
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Their

conduct in so disregarding their ethical and professional
obligations was for the purpose of concealing the wrongful conduct
of Gurley and themselves and was in pursuit of the conspiracy.
43.

The acts of Soltis and Stringham alleged constitute acts

in concert with Gurley# or the aiding, abetting or assistance to
Gurley, within the meaning and intent of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985
and 1986, and Soltis and Stringham cooperated with Gurley in
deceiving the court and subverting the truth-finding process,
within the meaning and intent of Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar Association and the commentary
thereto, by refusing to withdraw the affidavit of April 18, 1991
or make full disclosure to the court and Plaintiff that it
contained perjury, and Defendants Soltis and Stringham are
therefore principals with respect to the wrongful acts of Gurley
alleged herein.
CONDUCT OF PROVAN (AND DWR)
AND VAN DAM (AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL)
44.

At all times alleged, Provan was the Director of DWR, the

superior to Gurley and responsible to supervise and control
Gurley7s conduct, and acted in both his personal and representative capacities.
45.

At all times alleged, Van Dam was the Attorney General of

the State of Utah, the superior to Soltis and Stringham and
responsible to supervise and control the conduct of Soltis and
Stringham, and acted in both his personal and representative
capacities.
46.

Provan knew, or had reason to know for a period of years

prior to September 8, 1990# that Gurley was acting outside the
scope of his employment with respect to groups or persons,
including Plaintiff, engaged in training hunting dogs by means of
the use of live, domestic game birds, lawfully acquired, pursuant
to said proclamations of DWR and the Wildlife Board; that Gurley's
conduct created an unreasonable risk of harm to the lawful
interests of such persons; and Provan knew or had reason to know
that he had the ability to control Gurley and that such control
was necessary to prevent the unreasonable harm to lawful rights of
others under the laws and proclamations of the Wildlife Board.
47.

Provan was informed of the conduct of Gurley alleged

herein on or about September 10, 1990, and was further informed of
Gurley's conduct alleged herein thereafter, but declined to take
any action with respect thereto in his capacity as Gurley's
superior.
48.

Van Dam was informed, on or about October 9, 1991, and

thereafter, of the wrongful conduct of Soltis and Stringham, and
acknowledged being so informed and of his obligation to supervise
Soltis and Stringham in a letter to Plaintiff dated October 11,
1991, but declined to take any action with respect thereto in his
capacity as Soltis and Stringham's superior.
49.

Provan and Van Dam were further obligated to take

corrective action with respect to the conduct of Gurley under the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2, providing that property in
the possession of any peace officer not needed as evidence shall
be returned to the lawful owner by the prosecutor and the agency
having possession thereof.

At all times alleged, Van Dam was the
_

1O

_

"prosecuting attorney" and Provan was the Director of the agency
employing Gurley, within the meaning and intent of Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-24-2, and Plaintiff served notice on Provan and Van Dam,
together with Soltis, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2,
demanding return of the property alleged herein, on November 25,
1991.
50.

Provan, Van Dam and Soltis have failed to respond to said

demand pursuant tr Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2 in a reasonable time,
directly or indirectly, or as required by said statute and
Plaintiff believes, based upon reasonable information, and on such
belief alleges, that Provan, Soltis and Stringham failed to
respond to Plaintiff's demand for the return of his property in
any way until they and/or Gurley were confronted with the prospect
of discipline for their refusal by agencies or officials of the
State of Utah charged with regulation and control of law
enforcement.

Refusal by Gurley, Provan, Soltis and Van Dam to

respond to Plaintiff's demand in a reasonable time, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2, was pursuant to the conspiracy alleged.
51.

Defendants Provan and Van Dam failed to prevent the

wrongful conduct of Gurley, Soltis and Stringham alleged herein,
within the meaning and intent of 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
DAMAGES AND EQUITABLE RELIEF
52.

The conduct of Defendants amounts to interference with

contract rights of Plaintiff, including rights under said Lease
No. 798 and Certificate of Registration No. PWF-SLO-129, which
have no commercial value but significant and unique value to
Plaintiff and a class composed of persons engaged in training bird

dogs who are the direct beneficiaries of said lease and game farm
permit, the actual amount of which is difficult to appraise, but
are believed by Plaintiff to have a fair and reasonable value of
approximately $10,000.00.
53.

Plaintiff has suffered loss of his professional time and

been required to incur expenses for legal counsel herein, and in
the prosecution in The Court of Docket No. 900 300 302 in an
amount which is not yet determined but which Plaintiff believes
and alleges will be in excess of $50,000.00.
54.

As a further result of the intentional and wrongful acts

and failures to act as alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered
anxiety, apprehension, worry, embarrassment and other mental
anguish and as a result, has suffered damages in such amounts as
shall be proved at trial.
55.

Gurley's conduct will, unless restrained or enjoined,

result in immediate and irreparable injury to Plaintiff for which
there is no adequate remedy at law, for which money damages are
inadequate, including because Gurley's conduct, unless restrained
or enjoined, will result in injury to Plaintiff's reputation and
association with the Forest Service and other agencies of state
and federal government, Plaintiff will be prevented from
exercising the rights contracted for with the State of Utah in
Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 and will be prevented, both
directly and through his partner and co-lessee, Leslie Foote, from
exercising the rights under Certificate of Registration No.
PWF-SLO-129, all of which are of unique value and which cannot be
valued or compensated for in a money judgment or a judgment at law.

56.

Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on such

information and belief alleges, that there is a need for
injunctive relief because Gurley has continued his unlawful
activities, in defiance and contempt of the orders jof The Court,
either individually or in concert and participation with others,
including Provan, including by exceeding their statutory authority
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-17-8, 23-14-18(4) and 23-14-8, which
vest authority for establishing wildlife conservation rules in the
Wildlife Board and limit administrative and law enforcement
personnel of DV7R to execution of the policies of the Wildlife
Board, and by disregarding resolutions of the Wildlife Board
permitting dog trials in the State of Utah at any time, including
during the nesting season, other than in designated wildlife
preserves.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
57.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

58.

The peaceable and quiet possession of Plaintiff's rights

56.

under Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 with the State of Utah,
Certificate of Registration, No. PWF-SLO-129 and the peaceable,
quiet and unmolested operation of Plaintiff's bird pen in
conjunction therewith are Constitutionally-protected property
rights; and the right to own and possess domestic game birds,
lawfully acquired, conduct the training of bird dogs by means of
the use of domestic game birds, lawfully acquired, pursuant to the
laws and proclamations of the State of Utah alleged, to conduct
litigation in the courts of the State of Utah to redress the

wrongful conduct of Gurley and to the return of Plaintiff's
property on demand pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2/ are
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States and the State of Utah, within the
meaning and intent of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.
59.

The conduct of Soltis, Stringham and Gurley was performed

under color of various statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs
or usages of the State of Utah and caused Plaintiff to be deprived
of various rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, in violation of 42
U.S.C- § 1983.
60.

The conduct of Soltis, Stringham and Gurley was in

disregard of the rights of Plaintiff secured by the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States proscribing
"any State [to] deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor to deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
61.

The conduct of Soltis and Stringham went beyond merely

acting as an advocate and consisted of joint action with Gurley in
preparing simulated judicial process and composing a false
statement that the simulated process had been "issued," and filing
false process in the form of the simulated citation and false
affidavit with The Court, the purpose or effect of which was to
deprive Plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States and the State of Utah, under color of various
statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs or usages of the State
of Utah.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
62.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

56 and 58 through 61.
63.

The conduct of Soltis, Stringham and Gurley was pursuant

to a conspiracy to obstruct the processes of any court of the
United States, including in particular proceedings before the
Third Judicial District Court for Tooele County, Utah, in said
Docket No. 900 300 302.
64.

One of the purposes of said Docket No. 900 300 302 was to

enforce and protect, by or through the device of a test case, the
rights of Plaintiff's co-lessees under said lease with the State
of Utah and said wildlife farm permit and the rights of a class of
persons comprised of all dog trainers who are direct or indirect
beneficiaries of said lease.
65.

Soltis, Stringham and Gurley, acting with two or more

persons in the State of Utah, conspired for the purpose of
impeding, hindering, obstructing or defeating the due course of
justice in the State of Utah, with the intent to deny Plaintiff,
who is a citizen of the United States, the equal protection of the
laws or to injure Plaintiff or his property for lawfully
enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person to
the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the provisions
Of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
66.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

56 and 58 through 61.
67.

Soltis, Stringham and Gurley, acting with two or more
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persons in the State of Utah conspired for the purpose of
depriving Plaintiff, either directly or indirectly, of the equal
protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities of
the laws, including in particular the right to peaceably possess
Plaintiff's leasehold rights with the State of Utah, to possess
and own domestic game birds lawfully acquired and to engage in the
recreational activity of training bird dogs through the use of
domestic game birds lawfully acquired and further conspired to
prevent or hinder the constituted authorities of the State of
Utah, including members of the judiciary of the State of Utah,
from giving or securing Plaintiff and other persons similarly
situated the equal protection of the laws.

Said conduct was in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
68,

An element of the conspiracy was the invidious and

discriminatory purpose of Gurley to impede or prevent the training
of dogs and the conduct of field trials for the display of dog
training in the Vernon area, pursuant to the laws and proclamations of the State of Utah, by the entire class of persons engaged
in dog training in the State of Utah, which purpose has been
stated by Gurley on numerous occasions to numerous persons,
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
69-

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

56 and 58 through 61.
70.

Defendants Provan and Van Dam, having knowledge of the

wrongs conspired to be done by Gurley, Soltis and Stringham, and
others as alleged herein, or that said wrongs were about to be
committed, and having the power to prevent or aid in preventing
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the commission of said wrongs, neglected or refused to do so in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
71.

Defendants Provan and Van Dam are liable to Plaintiff for

all damages caused by the wrongful acts alleged in the preceding
paragraph, including damages for loss or injury to Plaintiff's
contract rights and other property, mental anguish, attorneys'
fees herein and loss of Plaintiff's professional time in the
prosecution of actions against Gurley in The Court in Docket No.
900 300 302.
72.

Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action did not accrue until

within one year prior to the filing of this Complaint for the
reason that the acts of Provan and Van Dam alleged did not occur
until after the filing by Defendants Soltis and Stringham of the
simulated legal process and false affidavit on April 18, 1991, and
after Van Dam was informed of the wrongful acts of Soltis and
Stringham and of Van Dam's obligations with respect thereto, which
information was given on or about October 9, 1991.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
73.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

74.

Plaintiff's rights under said Lease No. 798 and

56.

Certificate of Registration No. PWF-SLO-129 are contract rights
with the State of Utah.
75.

Defendants Soltis, Stringham and Gurley acted or failed

to act due to fraud or malice in the simulation and backdating of
a citation and investigative reports, the preparation by Soltis
and Stringham and false swearing by Gurley to a false affidavit,

the filing of the false affidavit with The Court and the refusal
of Soltis and Stringham to disclose the fraud and deception of
Gurley in relation to the simulated citation and false affidavit
as alleged herein, within the meaning and intent of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-4(4)
76.

Gurley acted intentionally with respect to his conduct

alleged at various times including on September 8, 1990, September
13, 1990, and April 18, 1991, and knew or was chargeable with
knowledge that his conduct would be substantially certain to
interfere with Plaintiff's contract rights with the State of Utah.
77•

Soltis, Stringham and Provan acted intentionally with

respect to their conduct alleged at various times including on and
after April 18, 1991, and knew or were chargeable with knowledge
that their conduct would be substantially certain to interfere
with Plaintiff's contract rights with the State of Utah.
78.

The conduct of Soltis and Stringham, considered

separately from the conduct of Gurley, constitutes a breach of
duty under the statutes, rules of civil procedure and provisions
of the code of professional responsibility of the legal profession
alleged, and Soltis and Stringham knew or were chargeable with
knowledge that their conduct gave substantial assistance and
encouragement to Gurley in the accomplishment of his wrongful and
tortious acts.

Soltis and Stringham are, therefore, persons

acting in concert with Gurley and jointly liable for the conduct
of Gurley.
79.

The conduct of Soltis, Van Dam and Provan, considered

separately from the conduct of Gurley, constitutes a breach of

dutv under Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2 and Soltis, Van Dam and Provan
knew or were chargeable with knowledge that their conduct gave
substantial assistance and encouragement to Gurley in the
accomplishment of his wrongful and tortious acts.

Soltis, Van Dam

and Provan are# therefore, persons acting in concert with Gurley
and jointly liable for the conduct of Gurley.
80.

The conduct of Soltis, Stringham, Gurley, Van Dam and

Provan alleged constitutes the tortious interference with
Plaintiff's contract rights with the State of Utah under said
Lease No. 798 and Certificate of Registration No. PWF-SLO-129.
81.

Soltis, Stringham, Gurley, Van Dam and Provan, acting

directly or through their principals, agents, subordinates and
co-conspirators, including Gurley, wrongfully interfered with the
contract rights of Plaintiff under Special Use Lease Agreement No,
798 and Certificate No. PWF-SLO-129, in bad faith and in disregard
of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203. Van Dam, Soltis
and Stringham aided and abetted Provan and his subordinates,
including Gurley, or counseled and advised and acted in concert
and conspiracy with them in the bad faith breach of Plaintiff's
contract rights.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
82.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

56, 74 and 76.
83.

Gurley acted intentionally and improperly to interfere

with Plaintiff's performance of his contract with the State of
Utah by preventing Plaintiff's performance or making Plaintiff's
performance under said Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 and

Certificate No. PWF-SLO-129 more expensive and burdensome,
including restraining or excluding Plaintiff from the place where
the contract must be performed and depriving Plaintiff and his
co-lessees of the necessary equipment and the live, domestic game
birds necessary to perform the contract.
84.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 77

through 81.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
85.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

56 and 76.
86.

Provan permitted Gurley to act as his subordinate or

inferior agent, knowing or having reason to know that Gurley would
act wrongfully as alleged herein, and Provan disregarded his duty
to control the conduct of Gurley having knowledge, or being
charged with the knowledge, that Gurley would harm members of the
public, including Plaintiff, if not controlled.
87.

Provan is liable to Plaintiff for the conduct of Gurley

because his employment, or continuing of the employment of Gurley,
constitutes the intentional or tortious employment of incompetent
or dangerous inferior agents or servants and failure to control
them or give them adequate instructions.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
88.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

56 and 76.
89.

Gurley destroyed the property of Plaintiff, or refused to

surrender it to Plaintiff in a reasonable time after demand by
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Plaintiff that he do so, and intentionally destroyed Plaintiff's
bird pen and related facilities or so materially altered its
physical condition as to change its identity and character, and is
liable for conversion thereof.
NINTH CAUSE OP ACTION
90.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

91.

Provan, Soltis and Van Dam were in constructive

56.

possession of Plaintiff's property, by virtue of Provan's status
as the superior to Gurley, and by virtue of the statutory
obligation of Provan, Soltis and Van Dam under Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-24-2, and refused and ignored the proper demand of Plaintiff
that they return Plaintiff's property.
92.

Provan, Soltis and Van Dam are liable to Plaintiff in

conversion.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
93.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

56 and 76.
94.

The conduct of Gurley was outside the scope of his

employment, including in particular by virtue of the determination
of The Court in said Docket No. 900 300 302 that "Peace officers,
including Conservation Officers such as [Gurley], are prohibited
by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-15 from breaking into
an enclosure such as that owned by Plaintiff" and that "the
conduct of [Gurley] was therefore without probable cause or
authority under provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1 that
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Conservation Officers shall follow the same procedure
in . . . enforcement of this code, as other peace officers."
95.

Provan breached his duty to exercise reasonable care to

control Gurley, after knowing or being charged with the knowledge
that Gurley was acting outside of the scope of his employment and
harming Plaintiff and his property.
96.

Provan is further liable to Plaintiff for the wrongful

conduct of Gurley, Provan having retained Gurley in his employment
after knowing, or being charged with knowledge, that Gurley was in
the habit of misbehaving and abusing his authority as a peace
officer and causing damage to Plaintiff and other members of the
public.
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
97.

Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

56, 75, 76, 94 and 95.
98.

The conduct of Soltis and Stringham was outside the scope

of their employment, including in particular by virtue of the
provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3.3,
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar Association,
DR 7-102(A)(4) and DR 7-102(A)(6), ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, and proscriptions against falsification of
government records at Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-511, falsification of
legal process at Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-513, and filing of false
statements at Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-502, 503 and 504.
99.

Provan knew, or was chargeable with knowledge, that the

only effective control which he could exercise over the wrongful
conduct of Gurley was to discharge Gurley as Provan7s subordinate.
- in
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By retaining Gurley as a subordinate employee to Provan, Provan
subjected himself to liability to Plaintiff and others for damages
caused by the wrongful conduct of Gurley.
100.

Van Dam breached his duty to exercise reasonable care to

control Soltis and Stringham, after knowing or being charged with
the knowledge that Soltis and Stringham were acting outside of the
scope of their employment and harming Plaintiff and his property.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendants as
follows:
A.

Enjoining Defendant Gurley, or any persons acting as

agents of Defendant Gurley or in concert or participation with
Defendant Gurley, from interfering, directly or indirectly, with
Plaintiff's rights under his lease with the State of Utah or the
rights of Plaintiff or Plaintiff's partners and affiliates under
their certificate of registration with the Wildlife Resources
Division, and further enjoining Defendant Gurley or any persons
acting in concert or participation with him from taking any action
against Plaintiff, or dog training groups of which Plaintiff is a
member or which Plaintiff is affiliated with, directly or
indirectly, with respect to dog training and/or dog trials.
B.

For money damages in the amount of $1,000.00 for

destruction of Plaintiff's bird pens and related facilities;
C.

For money damages in the amount of $10,000.00 for

interference with Plaintiff's contract rights;
D.

For money damages in the amount of $50,000.00 for damages

to Plaintiff's character and reputation;
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E.

For money damages for Plaintiff's anxiety, rage,

apprehension, worry and other mental anguish in the amount as
shall be proved at trial.
F.

For costs of this action, including a reasonable amount

for attorneys' fees; and
G.

For such further and additional relief as the Court

determines proper.
Bryce E. Roe, Esq.
Daniel Darger, Esq.
Parker M. Nielson, Esq.
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Parker M. Nielson
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro
(0074)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Mv

DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISIONBY ^

PARKER M. NIELSON
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

v.
JOHN P. SOLTIS, REED M.
STRINGHAM III, DALE GURLEY,
TIMOTHY H. PROVAN, R. PAUL VAN
DAM, DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF
UTAH,

No. 92-C-0485G

Judge J. Thomas Greene

Defendant.

This matter came before the court on plaintiff's Motion
and defendants' Cross-motions for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff

Parker M. Nielson was represented by himself, Bryce E. Roe, and
Daniel Darger.

Defendants Soltis, Stringham, Provan, Van Dam,

Attorney General, and Division of Wildlife Resources were
represented by Harold G. Christensen and Richard A. Van Wagoner.
Defendant Dale Gurley was represented by Dennis C. Ferguson.

The

parties filed extensive memoranda and supporting materials, after
which the court heard oral argument and took the matter under
advisement.

Now being fully advised, the court renders its

Memorandum Decision and Order.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Parker Nielson trains hunting dogs as a
hobby.

On February 1, 1989, plaintiff and two dog-training

associates entered into a Special Use Lease Agreement with the
Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry.

Under this agreement,

the State leased to plaintiff and his associates a parcel of land
in Tooele County for the purpose of "releasing and propagating
game birds for hunting dog training and conducting non-commercial
competition of hunting dogs."

Plaintiff maintained a bird pen

and related facilities for raising and possessing live game birds
on or near the leased property, about eight miles from his
temporary residence in Vernon.1

After completing his training

activities, plaintiff would not immediately collect his birds.
Instead, he would rely on the birds' "covey" instinct to draw
them back to the location of the bird pen, and eventually into
the recapture cones.2
Plaintiff's claims arise out of two separate but
related events.

The first event occurred on September 9, 1990,

the opening day of bird hunting season.

On the day before,

Plaintiff claims that the bird pen was on the leased
property. Defendant Gurley claims that the enclosure was on land
owned by the United States Forest Service. For purposes of
summary judgment, the court will assume plaintiff's pen was
located on the leased land.
2

Chukars' "covey11 instinct directs the birds to gather in
groups. By leaving one bird in his pen, plaintiff would rely on
the covey instinct to draw the roaming birds through the
recapture cones to obtain companionship with the bird inside.
2

plaintiff had purchased four chukars, game birds which plaintiff
intended to use in connection with his dog training activities.
On the morning of September 9th, plaintiff took three of the
birds out of his pen and began his training regimen.

At that

time, game officer Dale Gurley of the Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources was patrolling the Vernon-Bennion area of Tooele
County.3

It appears that plaintiff and Officer Gurley were well

acquainted.

They had been involved in various confrontations

stemming from their disagreement as to the appropriateness and
legality of some of plaintiff's dog training activities.

Gurley

maintains that while he was patrolling the area on September 9th,
he came upon two hunters who told him they had seen a bird trap
nearby, containing four game birds.

Gurley claims that he

followed the hunters' directions and discovered plaintiff's bird
pen, which contained one bird.

Gurley, thinking the pen was an

illegal trap, confiscated parts of it, and disabled the remaining
portion.
A brief description of the bird pen is in order. The
pen was made of chicken wire and plywood.

Its purpose was to

recapture plaintiff's game birds after training activities.
and water were placed inside the pen.

3

Feed

Birds obtained access to

Plaintiff claims that Gurley watched his training
activities from a distance for about 3 0 minutes. Gurley denies
this. However plaintiff does not allege that Gurley saw
plaintiff's bird pen before September 9, 1990 or knew where it
was located.
3

the pen through two "recapture cones" located just above the
ground.

The wide end of the recapture cone was on the outside of

the pen to facilitate entry.

The narrow end of the cone was on

the inside of the pen so that the birds, once inside, would not
try to escape.

There was a rectangular net wire propped up

against the tube to help guide the birds inside.

Several dog

training bird bands were located on a wire ring attached to the
pen.

However, there was no band on the one bird Gurley found

inside.

The door to the pen was locked.
At the time he discovered the pen, Gurley claims that

he did not know who the owner of the pen was, although later that
day, he was told that the bird pen belonged to plaintiff Parker
Nielson.
The second event occurred on April 18, 1991, and
involved the accuracy of an affidavit filed in connection with a
state civil action brought by plaintiff against Gurley for
damages resulting from the confiscation of the bird pen.

The

State had assigned Assistant Attorneys General John Soltis and
Reed Stringham to represent Gurley in that case.
a motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff filed

In connection with his response

to plaintiff's motion, Gurley filed an affidavit.

Reed Stringham

assisted Gurley in preparing the affidavit and John Soltis
assisted in preparing the response memorandum.

In his affidavit,

Gurley asserted that he had issued plaintiff a citation for
maintaining an illegal wildlife trap.
4

In reality, while a

citation had been filled out, it had not been filed or served on
the plaintiff.

The state court granted plaintiffs summary

judgment motion.

About four months later, plaintiff moved to

strike Gurley's affidavit because it contained inaccurate
statements.

The state court granted plaintiff/s motion and

awarded plaintiff over $3,000 in sanctions.

The state action is

still pending.
Plaintiff filed the present action alleging violations
of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
Plaintiff has also included various pendant state claims. All
the claims are before the court and are ripe for decision.
ANALYSIS
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court will grant summary judgment if the
"pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.11
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

The court reviews the "factual record and

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment."

Applied Genetics Int/1 v.

First Affiliated S&c. Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990)
(citing Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610, 613 (10th
Cir. 1988) . The moving party must carry its burden to show the
5

absence of a genuine issue for trial.

The opposing party may not

rest on the allegations or denials of its pleadings, but must
come forward with sufficient evidence to establish specific
triable issues of fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

324 (1986); Gonzales v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417,
1419 (10th Cir.1991).

In considering summary judgment, the judge

is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter, but rather determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986).
OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff requests the court to apply the theory of
offensive collateral estoppel and adopt the findings made by the
state court in its determination of plaintiff's summary judgment
motion.

In Griffin v. Strong, 739 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Utah 1990),

this court identified the four elements recognized by the Tenth
Circuit as necessary to apply collateral estoppel:
1) The issue decided in the prior adjudication was
identical with the one presented in the action in
question;
2) There was a final adjudication on the merits;
3) The party against whom estoppel is asserted is a
party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication;
4) The issue in the first case was competently, fully,
and fairly litigated.
Id. at 1501 (citing In re Lombard, 739 F.2d 499, 502 (10th Cir.
6

1984)).

As in Griffin, this case involves the application of

offensive collateral estoppel.

This means that collateral

estoppel is sought to be used as an offensive tool to preclude
the defendants from making arguments which otherwise might be
available to them.

The Supreme Court has granted trial courts

broad discretion in determining when offensive collateral
estoppel should be applied.

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439

U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
Applying the above factors, it becomes apparent that
collateral estoppel should not be applied in this case against
any of the defendants.

First, only Gurley was a party or in

privity with a party in the state proceeding.

This bars the use

of collateral estoppel against the other defendants.

Second,

there is a serious question whether the same issues presently
before the court were fully adjudicated in the state proceeding.
The transcript of the state summary judgment hearing indicates
that the court did not sufficiently discuss whether Gurley had
probable cause to confiscate plaintiff's bird pen.

As will be

seen hereafter, whether Gurley had probable cause is the central
issue in plaintiff's § 1983 claim.

For these reasons, the court

declines to apply the principle of offensive collateral estoppel
against any of the defendants.

7

I. PLAINTIFF'S § 198 3 CLAIM AGAINST WILDLIFE GAME OFFICER
ARISING OUT OF CONFISCATION OF PLAINTIFF'S BIRD PEN.
Plaintiff alleges that Gurley violated his civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 19834 when Gurley disabled and confiscated
portions of his bird pen.
The two essential elements in a § 1983 action are:
M

(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person

acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct
deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United Stat€>s.n

Parratt v.

Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) overruled on other grounds by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

It is not disputed

that Gurley acted under color of state law when he seized
portions of plaintiff's bird pen.

However, the parties do

dispute whether Gurley's actions deprived plaintiff of any
constitutional right.

In this case, there are two possible

constitutional rights upon which plaintiff may base a § 1983
claim:

(1) Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right against

unreasonable searches and seizures; and (2) Plaintiff's
4

Section 1983 imposes civil liability on
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States
... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws....

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
8

Fourteenth Amendment right against deprivation of property
without due process of law,5

After considerable review, the

court determines that neither of these constitutional rights were
violated by Gurley.
A.

Unreasonable Search and Seizure Under the Fourth

Amendment
Plaintiff claims that Gurley's confiscation of his
bird pen constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.6

Gurley confiscated

plaintiff's bird pen because he thought it was an illegal
wildlife trap, but he did so without first obtaining a warrant.
The Fourth Amendment generally requires law enforcement officials
to obtain a warrant before searching for and/or confiscating
evidence.

However, there are exceptions under which a

warrantless search and seizure is valid.

One of these exceptions

is the "plain view doctrine" under which the seizure of an item
5

Plaintiff has been less than clear as to which of these
constitutional rights were allegedly violated by Officer Gurley's
action. Accordingly, the court will discuss both rights.
6

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of individuals to
be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
The Fourth Amendment itself only applies to the federal
government. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to state
governments. For this reason, plaintiff's claim is more
accurately defined as being based upon the Fourth Amendment as
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, in order to easily distinguish between the
different constitutional rights implicated in plaintiff's
complaint, the court will by-pass reference to the incorporation
doctrine and merely refer to plaintiff's search and seizure claim
as arising under the Fourth Amendment.
9

without a warrant is valid if the following circumstances exist:
(1) The law enforcement officer is legitimately on the
premises;7
(2) The officer sees the item in plain view;8
(3) The officer has probable cause to believe that the
item is evidence, fruit, or instrumentality of crime,
or contraband;9
(4) The incriminating character of the item is
immediately apparent;10 and
(5) It would not be reasonably practicable to obtain a
warrant prior to seizure of the item.11
These elements will be considered seriatim.
1. Legitimacy of Presence on Premises and Seeing
the Item in Plain View.
There is no doubt that the first and second
elements of the plain view doctrine are present in this case.
Plaintiff's bird pen was located in a remote area of Tooele
County consisting primarily of state and federal lands.
was a state game officer assigned to that area.

Gurley

As such, Gurley

had the right to patrol the area and be in position to discover
plaintiff's bird pen on the day it was dismantled and

7

Horton v. California. 496 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1990).

8

Id. at 136.

9

Id. at 142; Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987).

10

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. at 136.

n

Id. at 137; Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980).
10

confiscated.12
2.

Probable Cause and Incriminating Character
The third element—the key issue herein—is

whether Gurley had probable cause to believe that plaintiff's
bird pen was an illegal trap.

Probable cause is a question of

law determinable when "known facts and circumstances are
sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence the belief
that an offense has been or is being committed."

United States

v. Chavez, 812 F.2d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting United
States v. McEachin. 670 F.2d 1139, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
Defendant Gurley maintains that he acted pursuant to § 23-20-1(2)
of the Utah Code which directs state game officers to seize
illegal wildlife traps.

Section 23-20-1(2) reads as follows:

Materials and devices used for the unlawful
taking or possessing of protected wildlife
shall be seized, and upon a finding by the
court that they were used in the unlawful
taking or possessing of protected wildlife,
the materials and devices shall be
confiscated by the court, conveyed to the
division, and upon the expiration of time for
appeal, sold at a public auction or otherwise
disposed of by the division.
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1(2).

State wildlife regulations require

valid traps to be equipped with a license tag.13

Plaintiff's

12

Since wildlife is considered state property, game officers
have the responsibility of patrolling all land in the state
whether the land is owned by the state or the federal government.
13

Traps and other trapping devices used in taking any
wildlife must be permanently marked or tagged with the registered
number of the trapper using them. Identification numbers must be
11

bird pen was not equipped with such a license tag.

In addition,

state wildlife regulations direct that game birds may not be
"released" without state authorization, and that if they do
"escape," the birds become state property.14

Gurley and the

Division of Wildlife argue that once plaintiff let the birds roam
after training exercises, the birds effectively "escaped" from
his possession, and became the state's property.

As such, it is

submitted that the birds could not be recaptured without first
complying with the state's regulations regarding traps, including
the requirement that registered traps be equipped with a license
tag.
Plaintiff maintains that his pen did not need a license
tag because it was not a "trap."15 Plaintiff argues, rather,
legible and at least 1/4 inch in height.
11-3(C)(1) (1991).

Utah Admin. Code R608-

14

The applicable regulation reads,
Live game birds may not be released or
abandoned without first obtaining written
authorization from the Director of the
Division. Native and naturalized game birds
that escape from captivity become the
property of the state.

Utah Admin. Code R608-4-3 (1991).
15

Plaintiff argues that the license tag requirement is
inapplicable here because it is found in R608-11, which deals
with the taking of "furbearers." The definition of "furbearer"
does not include birds. Utah Admin. Code R608-ll-2(7) (1991).
However, the license requirement applies to the
trapping of "any wildlife." The definition of wildlife includes
"[a]ny species of vertebrate animal life except feral animals
generally living in a state of nature." Utah Code Ann. 23-1312

that his bird pen was a "private wildlife farm" which he was
legally allowed to maintain pursuant to Division of Wildlife
regulations. Utah Admin. Code R608-4-2(7) (1991).16

Those

regulations require registered owners of private wildlife farms
to exhibit, if asked, registration documents. Utah Admin. Code
R608-4-3 (1991) . In this regard, plaintiff says that he had that
proof of registration with him on September 9, 1990 and that all
Gurley needed to do was find him and ask for the appropriate
documents.

Further, plaintiff contends that even though he did

not collect his birds immediately after training, the birds were
not "released" nor did they "escape" as defined in R608-4-3.
Plaintiff's bird pen may have been legal. However,
that is not the issue before the court. Rather, the court must
determine whether from the facts and surrounding circumstances
presented in connection with the motion, a person of reasonable
prudence could believe that the bird pen was an illegal wildlife
trap.

Regardless of how plaintiff chooses to describe his pen,

he cannot escape the fact that the pen's purpose was to attract

2(40). "Feral Animals" are defined as "any animal which is
normally domesticated but has reverted to the wild." Utah Code
Ann. § 23-13-2(10). Chukars clearly do not fit the definition of
"feral" and therefore must be considered "wildlife." Hence, the
license requirement would apply to the trapping of chukars.
^Regulation R608-4-2(7) defines a private wildlife farm as
"[a]n enclosed place such as, but not limited to, a pen or
aviary, where privately owned game birds are propagated or kept
and which enclosure restricts the birds from escaping into the
wild." Utah Admin. Code R608-4-2(7) (1991).
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and capture game birds.

The pen looked like a trap, it

functioned as a trap, and it functioned without any distinction
between plaintiff's game birds and other wildlife.

Its trap-like

attributes would be immediately apparent to any reasonable
person.
With respect to the fourth element necessary to justify
a seizure without a warrant, the fact that plaintiff's bird pen
lacked a license tag would warrant a prudent law enforcement
officer to believe that it was an illegal trap.

The

incriminating character of the pen would thus be readily and
immediately apparent.
For the aforesaid reasons, the court finds and rules
that Gurley had probable cause to believe that plaintiff's bird
pen was an illegal trap.
3.

Practicability of Obtaining Warrant
The final issue is whether it would have been

reasonably practicable for Gurley to obtain a warrant prior to
confiscating parts of the bird pen.

In this regard, it is

apparent that Gurley discovered plaintiff's recapture pen in a
remote area, far away from the individuals and procedures
necessary to obtain a warrant.

In the time required to apply for

and obtain a warrant, the "illegal trap11 could have been easily
dismantled or moved.

For this reason, the court finds that it

would not have been reasonably practicable for Gurley to obtain a
warrant prior to seizure of the pen.
14

Since the court has found all of the elements necessary
to justify application of the plain view doctrine exception to
the warrant requirement, it follows that there was no
unreasonable search and seizure in this case. Accordingly,
plaintiff's § 1983 claim based upon the Fourth Amendment must
fail.
B. Deprivation of Procedural Due Process Under the
Fourteenth Amendment
To successfully bring a § 1983 action for the
deprivation of procedural due process, plaintiff must establish
that the defendant, acting under color of state law, (1) deprived
plaintiff of a fundamental requirement of procedural due
process;17 and (2) engaged in deliberate misconduct.18
The fundamental requirement of procedural due process
is the opportunity to be heard.

In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.

527 (1981),19 the Supreme Court held that a state postdeprivation
remedy provides the opportunity to be heard and thus satisfies
the requirements of procedural due process.

In fact, the

postdeprivation remedy is adequate even though it "may not
provide the [plaintiff] with all the relief which may have been

17

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1981) overruled on
other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
18

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-33 (1986).

19

Parratt was overruled by Daniels insofar as it allowed
procedural due process claims under § 1983 for merely negligent
conduct. Daniels 474 U.S. at 330-31.
15

available if he could have proceeded under § 1983."

Id. at 544;

see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) ("an
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state
employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is
available.") .
In this case it is manifest that plaintiff has received
an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the confiscation of his
bird pen.

Plaintiff has aggressively pursued a state action

against Gurley, has been given the opportunity to be heard, and
has been successful in that action on summary judgment.
Plaintiff also cannot establish that Gurley engaged in
deliberate misconduct.

In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327

(1986), the Supreme Court held that mere negligence of a state
official cannot "deprive" an individual of his or her procedural
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 33 0-31.

Rather, the guarantee of due process applies to "deliberate"
decisions of government.

Id. at 331; Apodaca v. Rio Arriba

County Sheriff's Dept.. 905 F.2d 1445, 1447 (10th Cir. 1990).
The court has already determined that Gurley acted with probable
cause when he disabled and confiscated plaintiff's bird pen.

The

existence of such probable cause defeats plaintiff's allegation
that Gurley engaged in deliberate misconduct.
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff's claim of alleged
16

deprivation of his procedural due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment is denied.
II. PLAINTIFF'S § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST STATE ATTORNEYS AND STATE
WILDLIFE OFFICER ARISING OUT OF THE FILING OF AN ALLEGEDLY FALSE
AFFIDAVIT.
In response to plaintiffs summary judgment motion in
the state action, Gurley filed an affidavit with the aid of
Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham.

In his affidavit,

Gurley testified that he had mailed a citation to plaintiff for
violation of state wildlife laws.

In reality, a citation had

been filled out, but had never been filed or delivered to the
plaintiff.

Plaintiff claims that the filing of Gurley's

affidavit constituted perjury and deprived him of his substantive
due process right of freedom from perjury in court proceedings.20
Plaintiff cites three cases to support his position
that perjury, in and of itself, is actionable under § 1983.
Brown v. Johnston, 675 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Spears v.
Conlisk. 440 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. 111. 1977); Moore^v. Koelzer, 457
F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972).
Brown,21 Spears,22 and Moore23 involved state actors
20

Gurley, Stringham, and Soltis dispute plaintiff's
characterization of the affidavit as perjury. However, the court
will adopt plaintiff's characterization for purposes of summary
judgment.
21

In Brown, the defendants allegedly conspired with the
district attorney to bring unfounded forgery charges against the
plaintiff. The court recognized the availability of a § 1983
action for malicious prosecution as well as abuse of process.
17

falsely bringing criminal charges against the plaintiff.

The

cases involved malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and the
plaintiffs right to a fair criminal trial.24 While perjury was
involved in all three cases, it was included inside another
actionable theory.

It did not stand on its own.

Brown, Spears, and Moore are inapposite and do not
support recognition of a § 1983 action based on perjury alone.
The present action is based upon the conduct of a defendant in a
civil proceeding, not upon the actions of police or prosecutors

Brown, 675 F. Supp. at 289-90.
22

In Spears, defendants falsely accused plaintiff of criminal
wrongdoing and gave false testimony at his criminal trial. The
court held that the police officers' conduct deprived the
plaintiff of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and was actionable
under § 1983, apparently on the theory of malicious prosecution.
In this regard, the court in Spears cited to a similar Seventh
Circuit case, Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1977) in
which the Seventh Circuit recognized a § 1983 claim against
police officers and firemen for assaulting, unlawfully arresting,
and maliciously attempting to have false chcirges issued against
the plaintiffs.
23

In Moore, the state defendants allegedly falsified legal
documents and falsely testified at the plaintiff's criminal
trial. The court held that a violation of an individuals Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights was actionable under § 1983. Moore,
457 F.2d at 893. The court did not mention an action based on
perjury alone.
24

In Miller v. Glanz. 948 F.2d 1562 (10th Cir. 1991), the
Tenth Circuit held that state defendants are absolutely immune
from claims based upon alleged conspiracies to commit perjury in
criminal proceedings. Id. at 1570. In addition, the court
stated that, ff[W]e find nothing in the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 suggesting that Congress intended to
provide a cause of action for conspiracy to commit perjury in
order to obtain a criminal conviction.11 Id. at 1571.
18
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"Plaintiff ha s indicated that the filing of Gurley's
citation may have constituted malicious prosecution. However, as
was stated before, the citation was never fi led and never
delivered to the plaintiff.
26

Plaintiff has cited two cases which involve the right of
access to the courts. Both cases held that plaintiff's right of
access w a s not sufficiently impeded to form the basis for a §
1983 action. Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 804
F.2d 953, 959 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Graham cannot claim, however,
that the defendants completely denied him access to the courts,
since he successfully pursued his state court action,, , " ) ;
Rvland v. Shapiro, 586 F. Supp. 1495, 1502 (W.D. La. 1984) ("The
defendants ... did not interfere with the Ryland's access to the
Louisiana courts for the purpose of bringing a wrongful death
claim.").
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relates to the filing of Gurley's affidavit in state court.27
III. PLAINTIFF'S § 1985 ACTION AGAINST STATE ATTORNEYS AND STATE
WILDLIFE OFFICER.
Plaintiff asserts claims against Gurley, Stringham, and
Soltis based upon the second clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and §
1985(3) which create liability for conspiracies which deny
plaintiffs equal protection of the laws.28

The Supreme Court has

27

Even if plaintiff had been able to formulate an actionable
§ 1983 theory, he could not have prevailed against Gurley.
Gurley has absolute immunity with regard to the filing of his
affidavit. The Supreme Court has stated that there can be no §
1983 liability arising out of testimony given in a prior judicial
proceeding. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983); Miller v.
Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1570 (10th Cir. 1991).
28The

second part of § 1985(2) and § 1985(3) read as follows:
(2)... if two or more persons conspire for
the purpose of impeding, hindering,
obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the
due course of justice in any State, or
Territory, with intent to deny to.any citizen
the equal protection of the laws, or to
injure him or his property for lawfully
enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the
right of any person, or class of persons, to
the equal protection of the laws;
(3) If two or more persons in any State or
Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or
if two or more persons conspire to prevent by
force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen
who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving
his support or advocacy in a legal manner,
toward or in favor of the election of any
lawfully qualified person as an elector for
20
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people whose cars were towed without probable cause, Rogers v.
Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 202-203 (7th Cir.
1985).
Plaintiff requests that the court include dog trainers
as a protected class.

Even the most liberal interpretation of

the civil rights laws does not allow the court to include dog
trainers as a racial or similarly protected class.

For this

reason, plaintiff's § 1985(2) & (3) claims must fail.
IV. PLAINTIFF'S §1986 CLAIM AGAINST STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
DIRECTOR OF STATE DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES.
Section 1986 imposes liability on persons who refuse to
prevent § 1985 violations when they have knowledge of the
violation and power to prevent it.29

Plaintiff claims that Utah

State Attorney General Paul Van Dam and Division of Wildlife
Resources Director Timothy Provan had constructive knowledge and
control over the activities of their subordinates and failed to
prevent them from violating plaintiff's civil rights.
Section 1986 liability only arises when there is a §

29

Section 1986 reads in part:
Every person who, having knowledge that any
of the wrongs conspired to be done, and
mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are
about to be committed, and having power to
prevent or aid in preventing the commission
of the same, neglects or refuses so to do,
... shall be liable... .

42 U.S.C. § 1986.
22
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Counsel for defendants are directed to prepare and
lodge with the court a form of judgment consistent with this
Memorandum Decision and Order after first complying with Local
Rule 206(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

DECEMBER

[\p

. 1992

t^y. >cU-ae^J2^
J ^7 Thomas Greene
IITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 2 00 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,

]
i
i

AFFIDAVIT OF
PARKER M. NIELSON

i

Civil No. 900 300 302

i

Judge Pat B. Brian

vs.
DALE GURLEY,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

PARKER M. NIELSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and says as follows:
1.

That he is the Plaintiff herein, and submits the following

affidavit pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-505(1), Rules of
Judicial Administration, in support of an award of an amount equal
to the fair and reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time
authorized by the Minute Entry of the Honorable Richard H. Moffat
herein dated December 23, 1991.
2.

Affiant affirms on his personal knowledge and under oath,

that he has been required to expend professional time in searching
the records of the Third Circuit Court in Tooele, Utah, and the
Sixth Circuit Court in Nephi, Utah, concerning assertions of

GOOdOtf

Defendant, Dale Gurley, contained in his affidavit herein dated
April 18, 1991, writing correspondence to counsel for Gurley
herein requesting voluntary compliance with requirements of the
rules of civil procedure and of legal ethics concerning the
obvious falsity of said affidavit, and in filing and briefing
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley or
Require Compliance with Rules 7 and 11, as follows:
Searching records of the Third Circuit Court,
Tooele, Utah, including preparation and execution
of Certificate that no record of Citation No.
114020 is on file
1.50 hours
Telephone calls to Sixth Circuit Court,
Nephi, Utah, including preparation and execution
of Certificate that no record of Citation No.
114020 is on file
75 hours
Correspondence to counsel (copies of which were
attached to Plaintiffs motion dated November 14,
1991) requesting voluntary compliance, as follows:
6/12/91 (including review of file
necessary to compose the letter). 2.50 hours
9/3/91 (including research time
necessary to compose the letter). 1.80 hours
10/9/91 letter to Van Dam
10/14/91 letter to Van Dam
(including preparation of
enclosed memorandum)
11/8/91 letter to Van Dam
Total hours, correspondence

75 hours

1.50 hours
50 hours
7.05 hours

Preparation of Motion dated November 14, 1991
and supporting memorandum
10.00 hours
Preparation of Reply memorandum dated
December 2, 1991

6.00 hours
25.3 hours

"

2

"

A A A ^ r t P)

3.

Affiant further states that, had he not been required to

devote his time to said matters, his time would have been applied
to legal services for his established clients in his profession as
an attorney and counselor at law, principally to ongoing
securities litigation in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, Civil No. 90-C-224S, as to which affiant's
services are billed on an hourly basis at $130.00 per hour.
4.

Affiant further states that the fair and reasonable value

of Plaintiff's professional time set forth herein is $3,289.00,
and affirms the reasonableness of said sum for comparable legal
services.

The reasonableness of said amount is further indicated

by the assertion by counsel for Gurley at page 4 of his Reply
Memorandum herein dated December 20, 1991, that "Gurley's
attorneys fees . . . now exceed $15,000" for a period of time
inclusive of the time when Plaintiff's professional time set forth
herein was necessary.

HParker M. Nielson

- 3 -

00090o

Parker M. Nielson, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the Affiant herein; that he has read the above and
foregoing Affidavit of Parker M. Nielson; knows the contents
thereof and that the same is true of his own knowledge, excepting
as to matters therein alleged upon information and belief and as
to those matters he believes them to be true.

barker M. Nielson
Subscribed and sworn to before me this i? n£ day of January,
1992.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

day of January, 1992, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PARKER M.
NIELSON was mailed first class, postage prepaid to:
John P. Soltis
Reed M. Stringham III
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

:
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL
:
THOMAS MOXLEY, ESQUIRE
IN SUPPORT OF PARKER M.
::
: NIELSON ! S APPLICATION FOR
:
REIMBURSEMENT FOR
:
PROFESSIONAL TIME

Defendant.

:

NIELSON, PARKER M.

v.
GURLEY, DALE

Case No. 900300302 PD

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
PAUL THOMAS MOXLEY, being of full age and duly sworn upon his
oath deposes and says:

1.

I am an attorney practicing in Salt Lake City, State of

Utah and am a shareholder in the law firm of Campbell Maack &
Sessions.

I have been admitted to practice law since 1973 and am

a past-chairman of the Securities Section of the Utah State Bar and
am presently on the Board of Bar Commissioners for the State of
Utah.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the professional skills of

Parker M. Nielson and have been acquainted with him since the
1970s.

For a period of about five years, I worked on a number of

cases (one of these cases resulted in a writ of certiorari being
filed with the United States Supreme Court)with Parker M. Nielson
and shared offices with him for approximately two years in the

nnnas1

early 1980s.

I am also familiar with Parker M. Nielson as a result

of our both being active in the Securities Section and I have
participated with him on panel discussions concerning securities
litigation and also attended other CLE programs where Mr. Nielson
has been a presenter.
3.

From my knowledge of Parker M. Nielson, I am aware of the

following:
a.

Mr. Nielson has been a professor of law at the
University of Utah;

b.

Mr. Nielson has been a lecturer for ALI and ABA and
numerous other bar association committees.

c.

Mr.

Nielson

has

an

AV

rating

from

Martin-Dale

Hubbell which I understand is a rating that less
than five percent of all lawyers have.
d.

Mr. Nielson has successfully taken a case to the
United States Supreme Court and handled successfully the Affiliated Ute case which is one of the more
prominent

security

cases

decided

by

the

United

States Supreme Court in the last thirty years and I
believe only a handful of Utah lawyers have successfully handled cases at the United States Supreme Court.

2
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4.

I have

reviewed

the Affidavit

of

Parker

M.

Nielson

wherein he states that his professional time is being billed at
$130 per hour and from my experience as a lawyer in this community
that is a very reasonable fee given his experience, expertise and
standing in the legal community.
Dated this

Z>

day of January, 1992.

W^P

J^^^n^

Paul Thomas Moxley
PAUL THOMAS MOXLEY, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says: that he is the Affiant herein; that he has read the above and
foregoing Affidavit of Paul Thomas Moxley; knows the contents
thereof and that the same is true of his own knowledge, excepting
as to matters therein alleged upon information and belief and as to
those matters he believes them to be true.

b-^

aul Thomas Moxley
Subscribed
January, 1992.

and

sworn to before me this S^s.

day of

ftf>~L.. VOJSS^

rtoTARY PUBLIC
R e s i d i n g a t : S a l t Lake C i t y ,

Utah

My Commission Expires:
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